


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


Sir George Bromley Bar.t

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# PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE

ON THE

# NATURE OF DREAMS.

BY

THE REVEREND MR. SAALFELD,

MINISTER OF THE GOSPEL,

AT LUTZEN-SOMMEREN.

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# PREFACE.

DIVINES and Philoſophers have, as far as I know, barely made mention of Dreams in their writings; but not ſufficiently unfolded their nature, and properly diſtinguiſhed their ſeveral ſpecies: And leaſt of all have I met with any treatiſe, in which the nature of Dreams was duly diſcuſſed from principles of ſound reaſon, tho' in other reſpects we are overwhelmed with a number of paltry dream-books. I therefore long ſince thought it worth the while, to endeavour juſtly to diſtinguiſh the ſeveral ſpecies of Dreams,

and from rational principles to assign the peculiar characteristics of each species: Especially, as the Dreams, recorded in the Holy Scriptures, are considered by profane scoffers, as affording a sufficient handle to doubt of their divine original. And thus I have attempted to distinguish natural, from supernatural Dreams; and with respect to the latter, to shew, that there is no impropriety in thinking that God may, by their means, reveal and make himself known to mankind.

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# DISCOURSE

ON

# DREAMS, &c.

## SECTION I.

### The Nature, different Species, and Characteriſtics of DREAMS.

### CHAP. I.

*Definition of a* DREAM.

1. WHATEVER thing may at one time happen to differ from what it was at another, I call *mutable*. Of this nature is the actual exiſtence of the Creatures; alſo their actions and paſſions, which flow from their exiſtence, and are, or at leaſt may come to be, ſubject to ſuc-

ceſſive changes. If the mutable thing has ſuch a degree of limitation, or ſuch bounds fixed and marked out, that we can affirm, it ſtands thus, and no otherwiſe connected with other things, this I call the *State* of that thing: I may be well, or I may be ill; either of theſe caſes is poſſible. But at preſent that poſſible modification happens to be limited or fixed; as I enjoy a perfect health, which is the preſent State I actually find myſelf in.

2. IN the ſame ſpace of four and twenty hours a perſon is ſubject to a twofold, continually varying ſtate, § 1. In the one, in which he generally is in the day-time, he has the free uſe or exerciſe of the powers of ſoul and body, and can perform at pleaſure whatever is performable by them. This I call the *State of being awake.* In the night again he falls into an oppoſite ſtate, as being without the free uſe of his powers: And this again I call the *State of Sleep.*

3. IN Sleep a perſon is without the free uſe of his powers, § 2. Theſe powers are principally two: That of thinking, peculiar to the ſoul; and that of motion, to the body: The free uſe or exerciſe of both ceaſes in Sleep.

4. IN the definition § 2 and 3, I ſay, on purpoſe, *the free uſe*; as there are degrees in Sleep. The power of thinking is principally exerted in ſelf-conſciouſneſs, and in diſtinguiſhing one's ſelf from the other ſurrounding objects. The power of motion, in the change of the place of the body, or at leaſt of ſome principal parts thereof. Now if a perſon is entirely unconſcious, and if his body continues fixed in one and the ſame ſituation, we ſay, he is in a *deep Sleep*.

5. A MAN ordinarily falls into a deep ſleep, after employing both powers, or but one of them, § 3. to exceſs, in the

ordinary buſineſs of the day: And continues in it longer or ſhorter, as his powers were exhauſted more or leſs. But after enjoying the neceſſary reſt, he begins again to think: Yet ſo that the body is neither come to full motion, nor the ſoul to diſtinct ſelf-conſciouſneſs. The thoughts in this ſtate are called *Dreams.*

6. WHILE awake, our power of thinking is determined by our power of motion; and this laſt again, by that of thinking. That is, the Soul has repreſentations of the objects, which act on the external ſenſes; and again, the body moves at the will of the ſoul. Now though in Sleep and in Dream, the harmony between ſoul and body has not ceaſed; yet in that ſtate the ſoul thinks not on the objects, that act on the external ſenſes, but on ſuch as at that time cannot act upon them. Theſe laſt are ſaid to be *abſent*, as the firſt are ſaid to be *preſent* to the body. Accordingly, we never dream of objects preſent to,

but abſent from the body; and which formerly were impreſſed on the imaginative faculty.

7. BUT the ſoul never proceeds in the repreſentation of abſent objects in Dream, in the ſame manner ſhe does as when awake. When awake, ſhe receives the images, as offered to her by the ſenſes, and as ſtanding mutually connected, § 6. Whereas in Dream, though the images remain in themſelves unaltered, their connexion, however, comes to be full of confuſion and diſorder. Thus, by dividing the notions the ſoul formerly had, ſhe often has the repreſentation of a man without a head, and yet alive; and often by adding ſomething ſuperfluous to the objects, as horns to a perſon; or aſcribing ſomething impoſſible, as when ſhe images a man flying, though without adding or deducting any thing from his body. There is thus in Dreams a deviation in every reſpect from the genuine notions of things, and conſequently nothing but mere untruths:

Hence *Sirach* not unjuſtly calls them *unſubſtantial images:* As in the circumſtances and connexion of the actual things of this world, there is not any thing like what appears in Dreams.

8. BUT though in all Dreams there is a repreſentation of abſent objects, § 6, in the connexion of which there obtains much confuſion and diſorder, § 7; yet they have their degrees of diſtinctneſs. As ſometimes we not only know we had a Dream, but alſo the ſubject of it; at other times, we only know we had a Dream, but not the ſubject. The firſt may be called *lively*; the laſt, *obſcure Dreams*. And it is eaſy to conceive, that obſcure Dreams follow immediately upon deep ſleep, § 5: the lively, which in their degree we might call diſtinct, not before we have ſufficiently reſted. But whence it happens that ſome are obſcure, others lively, will appear as we proceed.

9. OUR ſouls are poſſeſſed of a power or faculty of re-producing the repreſentations, procured from ſenſation, after the ſenſation is paſt; and of exhibiting them as preſent. This faculty is called the *imagination*. Now if this power of the ſoul re-produces the images ſhe formerly had, in ſo diſtinct a manner, that we are conſcious of every thing contained in them, it is denominated *lively*: But if we cannot again recollect all the parts of the repreſentations we formerly had, it is called *obſcure*. Now if we dream about abſent objects, which the ſoul formerly impreſſed on the imagination, as ſhe received them from ſenſation, § 6. their livelineſs depends, § 8, on the re-production of the images by the imagination; and Dreams are, in that caſe, the mere work of that faculty.

10. IF we carefully attend to our imagination, we experience, that what at the ſame time, and in connexion with other things, formerly acted on our ſen-

ſes, is all of it, in its connexion, repreſented again by the imagination; as ſoon as but a part of the former ſenſation is exhibited by the memory, or by ſome other external cauſe. This is called the *law of the imagination*, as our imagination proceeds in all caſes according to it; and hence may be explained, how in our thoughts we always proceed from one object to another. Let one aſk a traveller, whether he ever ſaw this or the other famous city? and he will directly anſwer not only that queſtion, but alſo ſubjoin whatever of an agreeable or diſagreeable nature befel him on his journey thither, and in the city itſelf. Let a perſon be mentioned, with whom another came acquainted in a general company; this other will not only recollect the reſt of the perſons preſent, but alſo whatever happened of a more general or particular nature in the company. And ſo in all other caſes.

II. DREAMS exhibit abſent objects, § 6, confuſedly and irregularly, § 7;

yet at one time distinctly, at another obscurely, § 8. This is a work of the imagination, which at one time is more lively, at another more obscure, § 9; and hence the law of the imagination, § 10, is also the law by which Dreams may be explained, and must be accounted for.

12. SWOONING, which is a species of distemper, very much resembles deep sleep, § 4; as in it the person is neither self-conscious, nor the external parts of the body moved out of the place they occupied at that time: But sleep is a state, which we ordinarily fall into, and which has its reason in the lassitude of our powers, § 5; whereas swooning is an extraordinary state; and hence both may be easily distinguished, both as to their nature and consequences.

13. IT is something particular in dreams, that there are some men, who in this state get up to dangerous places, and speak and act like persons awake.

Yet as this caſe is rare, and indeed forms an exception from the ordinary dreams § 5, it is itſelf extraordinary; and hence, in explaining the eſſence of a Dream, not to be regarded.

14. THUS much is ſufficient to determine the notion of a dream in general; and hence I now come to the ſeveral ſpecies of it: Diſtinguiſhed, 1. by their origin, according to which they are natural or ſupernatural. 2. Their contents, according to which they are good or bad. 3. Their end, according to which they promote our happineſs or miſery. 4. Their iſſue, according to which they are ſignificative or preſaging, inſignificative or unpreſaging.

## CHAP. II.

### *Concerning natural Dreams, and their diſtinguiſhing characters or marks.*

15. THE ground or principle for forming a judgment of dreams was laid down § 11. But as they are of different ſpecies, they muſt be diſtinguiſhed. The moſt common diviſion, on account of their origin, is into Natural and Supernatural. The term, *natural*, is ſubject to ambiguity; and hence thoſe, who have made uſe of this diviſion, do almoſt all mean by it the dreams only, which have their origin from ourſelves; and reckon thoſe, that are excited by ſpirits without us, to be ſupernatural. But God alone can act ſupernaturally; and therefore thoſe proceeding immediately from God, are with better right called ſupernatural; but all the others, natural.

16. WHATEVER is conſonant with any power, is ſaid to be conformable to that power. Natural, whatever is conformable to a created power; and hence I call natural dreams, thoſe that are conformable to ſuch a created power, and may be explained and made intelligible from conſidering that power.

17. WE have a twofold created power, the thinking and the moving power, § 3. The power of good and evil ſpirits is in like manner created: And hence, equally with ours, is natural, § 16. And thus natural dreams ſubdivide again into three inferior ſpecies; namely, ſuch as proceed from ourſelves; thoſe that have their origin from good, and ſuch as have their riſe from evil ſpirits. Thoſe that proceed from ourſelves, as the efficient cauſes, we otherwiſe call *Domeſtick*; and under this appellation I ſhall henceforward treat of the firſt ſpecies of natural dreams: But ſhall apply the name *Angelical*, to

the ſecond, and the name *diabolical*, to the third ſpecies of Dreams.

18. DOMESTICK dreams are thoſe that ariſe from ourſelves: And which again proceed from the powers either of our ſoul or body; or alſo from a body without us, which acts upon ours; but of the action of which our ſoul forms a falſe repreſentation, and connects therewith other images, according to the law of the imagination, § 10. We muſt conſider all of them in particular; as they clear up to us the circumſtances of Natural Dreams in their origin.

19. DREAMS, which ariſe from ourſelves, and from the power of our ſoul in particular, have for their ground the thoughts we had while awake; and which by our attention have been made more lively than others. But ordinarily thoſe thoughts are moſt lively, which are conformable to our inclinations, or which have been employed about ſomething extraordinary, or uncommon.

20. WE have all, without exception, an innate desire to be happy. Now whatever is conducive to this purpose, we call good; and evil whatever is obstructive thereto; and we have naturally a bias to endeavour the obtaining the good; as we have an aversion from the evil: And herein in general consists our inclination. But the judgments we form of happiness, its nature, and the means to obtain it, are very unequal and different: And hence we need not at all wonder, that so many labour after the possession of things, which have the appearance of good, but in reality do not render us happy. Yea, if we would deal uprightly, we must allow, that we have all inherited the folly to delight ourselves in apparent goods; though one possesses more or less of them than another.

21. OTHERS labour after the useful in this present life, and these are the covetous; others again after the agreeable, these are called the voluptuous; others,

moreover, ſtrive after preferment and honour, and theſe are denominated the ambitious. To one or other of theſe inclinations men are certainly given; if not to two, or to all the three at once. But they are accounted to this or the other ſpecies, from the inclination which above others predominates in their actions. Whether this difference of predominant inclination is to be derived from a peculiar mixture or craſis of the juices of the body, and above all, of the blood, or from education, and intercourſe with others, is immaterial at preſent to enquire. If we but know to which of them the preference is given, this of itſelf is ſufficient to enable us to aſſign the origin of many dreams, and give an intelligible account of them.

22. THE Covetous direct all their efforts to collect the things of this earth, and keep a faſt hold of them when collected. This is their principal occupation, and the thoughts, entertained on this occaſion, are the moſt lively, § 19. Now if theſe perſons dream of money, or of other

things, which are prized in the world; of fire, or thieves, or any other thing, that could deſtroy their idol, and diſſipate what they had collected with ſuch care; all this is conformable to their inclination, and the origin of ſuch dreams intelligible.

23. JUST ſo it is conformable to the inclination of a voluptuous perſon, to dream of feaſting, revelling, and parties of pleaſure: As to an ambitious perſon, it need not appear ſtrange, if his imagination repreſents to him actions, leading to honour, or efforts made of coming to poſts of honour, and whatever is connected therewith; and if in dreams it is employed about theſe things.

24. IT will not be eaſy to find a man, who exerts himſelf in purſuit of one only of the apparent goods indicated § 21, to the excluſion of the others: All men rather would gladly have all three in their power. And though they eſteem one in preference to the others, yet at the ſame time they have an eye to theſe others, according as

their thoughts are more or leſs employed about them.

25. MEN, who are fully appriſed of the emptineſs of apparent goods, may look for, and actually find their happineſs in God. Theſe perſons employ themſelves in meditating on the nature, perfections, and works of God, and their thoughts about them are lively, as they find a delight and ſatisfaction therein. And thus it is conformable to their ſtate, ſhould they alſo dream of God and things divine.

26. As lively as our thoughts repreſent to themſelves the hoped for good, juſt ſo lively are they affected by the evil, which might hinder the obtaining or poſſeſſing the good; and thus it is conformable to the powers of our ſoul, alſo to dream of ſuch things, and to have frightful repreſentations of them.

27. THINGS, on which we freely employ our thoughts, do no leſs animate or

warm our imagination: As at this time, while I am writing down this, I reflect in the moſt intenſe manner, in preference to all other thoughts, how a dream may ordinarily ariſe in myſelf or other perſons. For this purpoſe I take up the proper notions, and examine them one after another, till I come ſo far, that I reckon I have explained every thing diſtinctly and intelligibly: And thus it would be quite conformable to the powers of my ſoul, if the very next opportunity I ſhould dream on the nature of dreams.

28. I CALL *extraordinary* a thing not known before, or at leaſt not common. If ſuch things or events offer to us, whether we have experienced them, or only read and heard of them, we apply our thoughts ſo intenſely thereto, that except ſelf-conſciouſneſs, we darken or weaken for ſome time all other notions, and only conſider, reflect on, and imprint on the memory and imagination, what our thoughts are then employed about. I will ſuppoſe a comet appeared this evening,

or an extraordinary phenomenon was at this time talked of, we might in both caſes experience the truth of this propoſition, both in ourſelves and others. Or, ſuppoſe a perſon relates to a grown child ſomething he did not know before, and obſerve his behaviour, and the queſtions he propoſes, and the thing would be equally plain: And that we ſhould alſo dream of it, is conformable to the powers of our ſoul.

29. WHOEVER requires a demonſtration of theſe propoſitions, may, by attention, obtain it from experience; and it will yield him the greater pleaſure, if the manner is aſſigned, in which a dream may ariſe from an antecedent waking thought. It is matter of experience, that when awake we compare the lively dreams § 8. we have had, with our laſt thoughts before we fell aſleep, or with the laſt thing which appeared extraordinary to us, and drew upon it our waking attention; and thus we are ſeldom at a loſs to diſcover the origin of our dreams; though in their

progreſs our imagination, § 9, according to its peculiar law, § 10, confuſes, divides, or adds ſomething to the images, that does not properly belong to them, § 7.

30. THE manner in which a dream ariſes from our waking thoughts, is thus: Our firſt ſleep is generally deep or ſound, according as in the day time we have fatigued the powers of ſoul or body, § 5. In deep ſleep we loſe ſelf-conſciouſneſs, § 4. But when this ſleep is over, the ſoul begins again to think, § 5. Now if previous to deep ſleep ſhe has been reflecting and meditating on ſome object or other, ſhe ſtill retains the memory of theſe reflections, after deep ſleep is ended; and directly upon this, the imagination begins to work.† If her thoughts, previous to deep ſleep, were employed about nothing of importance, ſhe recollects what, among a number of antecedent ſenſations, drew moſt her attention; with which then the imagination, according to the law thereof, § 10, proceeds to work.

† I think this with deſign.

31. BUT that we are not ſelf-conſcious in deep ſleep, § 4, is, doubtleſs, owing to the impediment, which the body oppoſes to the thinking power. For, the ſoul properly is not fatigued, only the body; which happens not only from its own, but alſo from the actings or employments of the ſoul. Whoever thinks cloſe but for a few hours, not to ſay, for moſt part of a day, will be equally ſenſible of a laſſitude in the body, as if he performed external actions with his hands. And it cannot poſſibly be otherwiſe, as according to the intimate union between ſoul and body, there ariſes with each thought a motion of the brain and nerves. Now if the body falls into a deep ſleep, its motive power ceaſes in the parts, which are otherwiſe ſubject to the command of the ſoul; and this prevents the ſoul from thinking ſo diſtinctly, as when awake.

32. THAT with each thought of the ſoul there ariſes a motion in the brain, and in ſome nerve or other, is evident from

experience. Obſerve but a perſon who is writing, and take heed to his mouth; and you will remark more or leſs in ſome, but in all a new motion of the mouth, unnoticed by the writer himſelf, accompanying almoſt each word: Which, however, is a faint attempt of the body to expreſs in words the thoughts of the ſoul, committed to the paper. If we happen to have lively dreams, we often recollect a faint motion of the body, which, though weak, was however in conformity to the dream. Thus it happens, that a perſon dreams of walking, but notwithſtanding all his efforts, cannot advance a ſingle ſtep; as the feet lie not at ſufficient freedom for motion, but are entangled in the bed. Whoever has no ſuch lively dreams, as to be able to recollect this or the like circumſtances; let him but obſerve a young child in the cradle, and the alterations his countenance undergoes in a dream: Or attend to a dreaming dog, how he twitches and draws his feet, and attempts to bark, though the noiſe be very weak, and though

he ſtill continues to lie in one and the ſame place.

33. FROM § 32, it will be alſo underſtood how it happens, that many people in ſleep and dream ſpeak aloud and cry out; and that thoſe who walk in their ſleep, § 13, act like perſons awake. Namely, the body of ſuch perſons is, on account of the nature of the blood and other juices, ſubject to no very deep ſleep. Whence it moves itſelf much ſtronger than ordinarily happens in dreams, though not fully rouſed. And if it be true that perſons, who walk in their ſleep, are waked immediately, on being called by name; this is a proof, that they ſleep not ſo ſound as other perſons, who on repeated calls, ſcarce awake even out of a dream.

34. NONE will fairly infer from § 31, that as the body in deep ſleep hinders the ſelf-conſciouſneſs of the ſoul, ſo the ſoul, out of its preſent groſs body, cannot think and be ſelf-conſcious; and hence muſt remain,

after the death of the body, in a deep ſleep, and be incapable of happineſs or miſery, till it is again united with the body; nor can any man charge me with it, as a propoſition I admit. For, it follows not immediately from the propoſition adduced by me, and founded on experience. If the ſoul in deep ſleep is not ſelf-conſcious, yet ſhe herſelf ſleeps not. Did ſhe ſleep at the ſame time with the body, it would be impoſſible ever to rouſe a perſon in deep ſleep; the contrary to which, however, is ſufficiently known. From this it follows that ſhe is awake, that is, retains her thinking faculty, even in the deep ſleep of the body, though not conſcious thereof: Otherwiſe ſhe could not repreſent to herſelf the objects acting violently on the organs of ſenſe, as calling, ſhaking, &c. or rouſe her body. But if ſhe never ſleeps in the body, ſhe will certainly ſtill leſs do ſo out of the body. And though the body in deep ſleep impedes her powers, ſo long as ſhe is united therewith, it cannot, however, quite deſtroy them, when ſeparated from her. But this is going too far

from my preſent deſign: Suffice it, that I deny the conſequence, though at preſent it may not be ſolidly confuted.

35. DREAMS, whoſe riſe we cannot deduce from antecedent thoughts, § 19, we may explain from the ſtate of the body, from its motive powers being either hindered or heightened, according as it has had, or ſtill continues to have, agreeable or diſagreeable ſenſations; ſeeing the repreſentations of the ſoul are always regulated according as the body happens to be diſpoſed. A perſon, who falls aſleep, with an empty ſtomach, readily dreams that he eats; a thirſty perſon, that he drinks; which can hardly be the caſe with an over-charged ſtomach; unleſs the perſon happens to imagine, he has got among a ſet of boon companions. And juſt ſo, a frightful dream may ariſe from intemperance, diſeaſe, or other diſorders of the body: And this holds in all caſes, in which the body has any inordinate motions of the internal parts.

36. WE dream not, ordinarily, till after deep ſleep; though, after that is over, the body is not yet fully rouſed, § 5. Whatever acts violently on the ſenſes in this ſtate, the ſoul repreſents to herſelf, § 34; though for the moſt part in a dark, and altogether falſe manner. And hence ſomething without the perſon may act on his organs of ſenſe, and excite the firſt thoughts, from which a dream may ariſe. Without the perſon there are, beſides, other bodies and ſpirits; and both theſe may give occaſion to a dream.

37. BODIES, which are preſent to me in ſleep, may act ſtrongly upon my body, and excite the firſt thoughts from which a dream may ariſe, § 36. This ſeems to contradict § 7, according to which we only dream of abſent things. But both propoſitions are in reality conſiſtent: After deep ſleep is ended, the ſoul begins again to think; yet ſo, that neither is the body fully rouſed, nor the ſoul diſtinctly ſelf-conſcious, § 5. In this ſtate of my per-

ſon, a watchman calls, whoſe voice is neither boiſterous, nor diſagreeable: He ſings part of a hymn; its ſound pierces my ears, the ſoul is ſenſible thereof, but attends not, whence it comes, nor of what nature it is. The imagination, upon this, excites the repreſentation of a ſinging choir, or even of a compleat band of muſick; theſe are abſent things, § 7; yet the dream aroſe from the action of a perſon preſent to me, § 36, upon my organs of hearing. Juſt ſo the fall of a body, the ſmell of an extinguiſhed candle, a mouſe, that runs over the bed, or over my head, and every other thing, capable of acting in the night-time upon the ſenſes, gives occaſion to the forming a falſe imagination, and hence a dream may ariſe, according to the law of the imagination, § 10.

38. BESIDES bodies, there are ſpiritual beings without us. For, effects there are, which cannot be conceived and explained from the motive powers of bodies. Some of theſe effects have a good; others a bad end or tendency: And ſuch as is this end,

ſuch muſt alſo be the efficient cauſe thereof: And hence there muſt be good and evil ſpirits. In many particular caſes the end is not obtained; eſpecially in thoſe that are intended to promote evil; therefore theſe effects ariſe from a limited or created power. And thus beſides man, there are created ſpirits, both good and bad. The former, in imitation of Scripture, we Chriſtians call by way of eminence *Angels*; the latter, *Devils*. Both of them may act on our ſoul, and on our body, excite thoughts, and conſequently alſo cauſe dreams.

39. AGAINST the concluſion, formed § 38, it may be objected, that the manner how a ſpirit can act on a body, is inconceivable; and conſequently a thing incredible, that ſpiritual beings without us ſhould excite dreams. But we experience this very effect in ourſelves; namely, that the ſpirit, reſiding in us, acts on our body; and hence the poſſibility of the thing cannot be denied: Though the reſolution of the queſtion, namely, how it happens,

ſhould for ever remain a myſtery to our underſtanding. The other difficulties, that may ſtill happen to ariſe, will be cleared up and removed, as we proceed.

40. IF we have called the dreams, produced from our own powers, § 17, *Domeſtick*: Thoſe, on the contrary, we may call *Foreign*, which have their origin from a ſpirit without us.

41. THE dreams, which ariſe from created ſpirits without us, are conformable to their powers; and hence they are ſuch as belong to the claſs of the natural dreams, § 16; but foreign to us, § 40; as they are not produced by our own, but by foreign powers.

42. THE Scriptures, which we Chriſtians receive as of divine authority, affirm of Angels, 1. that they are ſpirits, *Heb.* i. 14. 2. Of great power, and able to act upon us, *Iſ.* xxxvii. 36. *Dan.* ix. 21, &c. 3. That they have continued in their ſtate of goodneſs, *Matth.* xviii. 10. And 4,

that they contribute to promote the happineſs of men, *Heb.* i. 14. As there is nothing in all this account, inconſiſtent with their nature, we can have no exception to it, if we would act impartially and reaſonably: But muſt rather admit, that, ſuitably to this their nature, they may excite dreams in us, continue or carry them on; inſtruct us in what regards our happineſs, and warn us againſt what may be detrimental thereto.

43. THE ſame Scriptures inform us concerning Devils, 1. That they are morally evil ſpirits, 1 *Sam.* xvi. 14—16. 2. Act either mediately, by means of natural things, *Job* i. 12, &c. or immediately, *Job* ii. 1. And 3, That they ſeek to hurry men on to their deſtruction, 1 *Pet.* v. 8. Again, in this account there is nothing inconſiſtent, and therefore I aſſume it as true, and conclude from it, that Devils can act upon us, and excite dreams, continue or carry them on, and by them attempt our ruin. Theſe dreams, in other reſpects, are conſidered as a pecu-

liar ſpecies, and oppoſed as well to the natural, as to the Divine. But the Devil is a created being, and his operations in conformity to his powers: And hence the dreams, that owe their riſe to him, conſtitute a ſpecies, not oppoſed to the natural, but an inferior peculiar ſpecies of theſe laſt.

44. AFTER the explication given of natural dreams, and their ſeveral ſpecies, it remains, we now conſider, in what reſpects they are diſtinguiſhed as well from the ſupernatural, as in their ſeveral ſpecies, from each other; the better to be able to form the juſter judgment of the nature of each.

45. THE following marks or characteriſtics are common to all natural dreams, and diſtinguiſh them from the ſupernatural. Each natural dream ariſes not till after deep ſleep, § 5; for ordinarily in deep ſleep no one is ſelf-conſcious, § 4. As the ſleeping body hinders the thinking power, § 31, and no created being can

effect any change in the eſſence of another, or in whatever flows from that eſſence; ſuch as is deep ſleep. And hence a natural dream cannot ariſe till after deep ſleep.

46. A DREAM ariſes after deep ſleep, § 5, but it is more obſcure, when immediately following upon this ſtate; and more lively, after the body is better ſlept, and more awaked, § 8, but yet not quite awake, § 2, as it cannot at pleaſure exert its powers, § 3. And thus in a natural dream the ſoul as little uſes her powers, as ſhe can move from one place to another the parts of her body, ſubject to her command in a waking ſtate, § 31.

47. IN a dream the ſoul repreſents to herſelf abſent things, § 6. This property is alſo peculiar to the natural: And if each dream is full of confuſion and diſorder, § 7, in connecting the images, this is leaſt of all wanting in the natural.

48. DREAMS are an effect of the imaginative faculty, § 9, and in conformity

to its law, § 10; and therefore from that they may be explained, § 11, whether they happen to be obſcure, or lively, § 9: and moſt of all this holds in natural dreams. But as in dreams the imagination is at work, it hence appears, that the powers, which the ſoul, on account of the impediments oppoſed to her by the body, § 31, cannot exert in this ſtate, are the underſtanding, or judging faculty, and the free choice of the will, which depends thereon.

49. CREATED beings are either ſpirits or body; each ſpecies has its peculiar powers, § 3, and from theſe the origin of natural dreams admits of an explication, § 16. I well know, this is a difficult taſk in ſingle ſeparate dreams; but yet not impoſſible; and experience ſhews, that moſt of them may be accounted for by one, who is accuſtomed to conſider and obſerve the particular circumſtances upon every emergency.

50. AMONG the natural dreams, the Domeſtic are firſt of all explained, § 17. Their marks we are in the next place to obſerve. Domeſtic dreams ariſe from antecedent thoughts, § 19: if a dream admits the being derived from this fource, it is natural; but from what thoughts, and in what manner it ariſes, was ſhewn § 20—34.

51. WE have an appropriated body, the ſtate of which may give occaſion to the riſe of a dream, § 35. This happens naturally, § 16; and hence the ſtate of the body affords a characteriſtic of natural, and in particular, of domeſtic dreams.

52. OTHER bodies, preſent to ours, may act thereon in ſleep, and excite the firſt thoughts, from which a dream ariſes, § 37: If we can point out ſuch an origin, the dream is natural and domeſtic.

53. DOMESTIC dreams are a mere work of the imaginative faculty, without any

end or conſequence; but whatever is ſuch, we call inſignificant or unpreſaging; and hence all domeſtick dreams are inſignificant. Some years ſince, I knew a ſick perſon dream that his clock was down. The origin of this dream admits of a natural explication; he might, a little before he fell aſleep, be thinking of his clock; or it ſtood near him, and he heard its motion and ſtrokes, as he lay ſlumbering: he himſelf interpreted it of his death, yet without any bad conſequence, as he is this moment living, and in perfect health. An extraordinary natural dream, with his judgment upon it, we find in *Witſius's Miſcell. Sacr.* lib. I. cap. v. § 5 and 6.

54. *Significant* or preſaging, I call whatever happens on account of ſome certain end. Thus the ringing of bells is a ſignal for divine ſervice, or for whatever in particular belongs thereto; as ſingle and repeated ſtrokes on a bell are ſignals of a fire; and in forts, in time of peace, the ſame thing is indicated by firing one or more guns. Now in order to apply this deno-

mination to a dream, it must be such, as has for its end our happiness or misery, and which it afterwards manifests by the event.

55. THUS to the significant or presaging dreams belong all such natural dreams, as take their rise from created spirits without us: For the end of the Angelical has already been remarked, § 42, and of the Diabolical, § 43. But we will also moreover, for the greater distinctness sake, in particular unfold their marks or characteristics.

56. ANGEL and Devil are in their nature spirits, but think and act suitably to their moral characters. Thus good Angels have good ends, for which they act on men in sleep, and suggest certain thoughts to them in dreams: As on the contrary, the Devil has as bad, as he himself is morally bad. But as they excite dreams in us, such must also have the general characteristics of dreams.

57. AN Angelic dream thus reſembles a Domeſtic: 1. In that it ariſes after deep ſleep, § 5. For an Angel, how extraordinarily great ſoever his created powers may be, cannot act in contradiction to the law of our imaginative faculty, which is founded on the union between ſoul and body, and connects with each thought a motion of the brain and nerves, § 32, which motion is inconſiſtent with a ſtate of deep ſleep. 2. In that it exhibits only abſent objects, § 6; and that in ſuch a manner, that, during the dream, our underſtanding neither forms a judgment, nor our will a choice.

58. BUT it departs from the Domeſtic, 1. In that it is never obſcure, but always lively, § 8; as being what its end requires. 2. In that it conſiſts not of mere confuſed images, § 7; but contains diſcourſes rationally put together, *Dan.* vii. 16, &c. *Matth.* i. 20. xi. 13. And 3. In that it is ſignificant or preſaging; either as it inſtructs, *Dan.* vii. 16. *Matth.* i. 20; or

warns us againſt imminent danger, *Matth.* xi. 13. See alſo *Acts* xxvii. 23, 24, and 31.

59. A DIABOLICAL dream mimicks either the Angelical or the Domeſtic. A Devil would diſcover his folly, who, in exciting a dream, ſhould bewray himſelf as the author of it, or, in the repreſentations he produces, depart too much from the law of the imagination; for even hereby he would betray himſelf. But whether he transforms himſelf into an Angel of light, or miſemploys our imaginative faculty, yet from the contents we may diſcover both the end and the author; to which we are therefore principally to attend.

60. THE end of Diabolical dreams is the ruin of mankind, § 43; which is promoted, if men deſpiſe the real good, and chuſe the apparent, or even what is manifeſtly evil. Whatever a man chuſes, he chuſes under the notion of good, § 20. And hence the true good, § 25, muſt excite a jealouſy or diſguſt; the apparent,

§ 21, a pleaſure; and the manifeſtly evil be made a means for obtaining an apparent good. Though in this preſent life we cannot be without apparent goods, yet they deſerve not the name of the true and ſupreme good; as their poſſeſſion never yields us compleat ſatisfaction, and as in death they cannot in the leaſt avail our immortal ſoul.

61. IN conſequence of what we have eſtabliſhed, § 60, the marks of diabolical dreams will be, 1. That they miſlead from the real good, and ſeduce to ſuperſtition or impiety. 2. Reveal things of no manner of ſervice, what appearance ſoever they may put on. 3. Exhibit the apparent goods in a more lively manner, than the imagination is otherwiſe wont to do. 4. Make what is manifeſtly evil the means of obtaining an apparent good. 5. Excite lewd images in the imaginative faculty of ſuch as, when awake, deteſt them.

62. FROM the marks adduced, we may eaſily preſume, that the Devil principally

avails himſelf of the inclination of each particular perſon. And hence it will be a difficult matter, to diſtinguiſh them from the domeſtic dreams. But if wretched mortals ſhall ſuffer themſelves thus to be miſled, the event will ſhew they were deceived; and that by him, who ſeeks the ruin of mankind, § 43.

63. I MUST remark two circumſtances more about natural dreams, which may contribute ſomething to the forming a judgment of them. The firſt regards the Domeſtic, § 17. Some will have it obſerved, that people, who lay themſelves ſtraight on their backs, are more apt to dream in their ſleep than others; and thoſe on their left ſide, more than thoſe on their right. From my own experience I pretend not to a ſufficient proof of this. But ſhould it hold true, it ariſes from the circumſtances of the body in the ſaid poſition, § 35. Experience ſhews how little the repreſentations of the ſoul in violent high diſtempers differ from a dream. In the poſition on the back, the ſpinal marrow is

heated more than in any other. This marrow extends to the brain, and is closely connected with it; the brain is heated at the same time therewith, and causes what we observe to happen in high distempers; namely, sound sleep interrupted, and an occasion given to the soul to form confused representations and dreams. In the position on the left side, the motion of the heart, and consequently the circulation of the blood proves more difficult; and this may in like manner give occasion to many more, and those very frightful dreams.

64. THE other circumstance is common to all natural dreams, and more infallible than the first. Dreams, that hold long, fatigue afresh the most vigorous body. How this comes about, appears from § 32: Namely, it arises from the motion of the brain, but in particular of the nerves in dreaming, which in vain struggle to put the members of the body in motion.

## CHAP. III.

### *Concerning ſupernatural Dreams, and their characteriſtics.*

65. IF what is conſiſtent with the powers of created beings conſtitute what is natural, § 16; *ſupernatural* muſt be what is conſiſtent with, and explicable only by, the power of the Creator. And thus ſupernatural dreams are ſuch, as can only be accounted for from the infinite power of God: And hence they are eminently denominated *Divine.*

66. SUPERNATURAL dreams ceaſe not to be real dreams, and hence muſt have the general characteriſtics of a dream. But they are conſiſtent with the power of the Creator, and conſequently with his eſſential perfections; and as they exceed the natural powers of the creatures, they may admit a departing from the natural law of Dreams.

67. SLEEP, § 2, is the ſtate, in which dreams ariſe, § 5: And ſupernatural dreams alſo ariſe in no other, *Job* iv. 13. xxxiii. 15. It muſt, indeed, be owned, that when awake we have juſt as obſcure, confuſed repreſentations, put together by the imagination, as in dreams; but which we are not accuſtomed to call ſo in common life, in which the language of philoſophers is unknown. It appears ſomething odd, to ſay of a man, who ſpeaks and acts without underſtanding, that he dreams awake. And therefore I have ſecluded from the notion of a dream, whatever offers not in ſleep; as alſo another ſpecies of revelation, reſembling a dream, and happening by means of images, *Dan.* x. 8, 9. *Acts* x. 9—11; which I denominate not a dream, but an *extacy* or rapture.

68. IN a dream the ſoul repreſents to herſelf abſent objects, § 6: This alſo happens in the divine, *Gen.* xli. 18, &c. As they alſo have ſomething confuſed in the images, and their connections, § 7, *Dan.* xi. 31, &c.

69. In all dreams the imagination is at work, and according to the law thereof, § 10, puts together images, formerly produced by ſenſation. The very ſame thing happens in divine, *Dan.* vii. 2, &c. Theſe characteriſtics, juſt mentioned, the ſupernatural have in common with all the ſpecies of the natural; but others are peculiar to them only with the Angelical, and to no other ſpecies; and ſuch are the characteriſtics, in which the Angelical differ from the Domeſtic and the Diabolical.

70. According to § 58, the peculiar characteriſtics of Angelical dreams are; 1. That they are always lively. 2. Not barely confuſed images, but quite rational, connected diſcourſes. And 3. Have a good end. The very ſame things hold in the Divine: For, their end requires the firſt, as well as that of the Angelical: The ſecond may be ſeen from *Gen.* xx. 3, &c. And concerning the third, not only *Jeb* xxxiii. 16—18, but all the divine dreams

we have on record, teſtify. But how far they depart from one or other of theſe characteriſtics, will be ſhewn, when we come to the particular proof, § 79, of their divine original.

71. SUPERNATURAL or divine dreams muſt be conſiſtent no leſs with the perfections than with the works of God. For, God can do nothing inconſiſtent with his perfections, or inconſonant with his other works already extant; as he is the ſource of every good, the origin of every truth, he can therefore do nothing contradictory. It was, perhaps, from this ground or reaſon, that *Joſeph*'s dreams appeared ſuſpicious, as well to his father, as to his brethren. Had his father known, what great benefits God intended by means of *Joſeph*, and in what manner they were to be brought about, he would have hardly given the reprimand, *Gen.* xxxvii. 10. *Shall I and thy mother and thy brethren indeed come to bow down ourſelves to thee, to the earth?* Now his brethren formed the deſign to defeat the interpretation and

iſſue of his dreams. But the aged father might be at a loſs to reconcile them with the dutiful reverence of children towards parents; and his brethren, with the imagined prerogatives of elder above younger brethren: though the wiſdom of God was at no loſs to accompliſh them, without detriment to any of his perfections, or contradiction to any of his works.

72. HOLINESS is an eſſential perfection of God, whereby he is removed from all evil; which he is as far from willing, as well as incapable of doing. And therefore the contents or ſubject of ſupernatural or divine dreams are never morally evil, but muſt be always morally good. And as God is always gracious, and inclined to promote, never to obſtruct the happineſs of his creatures, while in a ſtate of probation in this life, divine dreams have the happineſs of men for their end: whence it follows at the ſame time, that all of them are ſignificant or preſaging, §. 54.

73. THOUGH ſupernatural dreams have the happineſs of man for their end, yet we are not hereby to exclude the glory of God, *Numb.* xii. 6, as the ultimate end of all God's works. And ſeeing the happineſs of men may be promoted as well by phyſically evil as phyſically good means, God may avail himſelf of both, if, at the ſame time, not morally evil, §. 72. See the ſaying, *Job.* xxxiii. 16, and the dream *Gen.* xl. 19. But whatever has any other end beſides the glory of God, and the welfare of mankind, is a diabolical ſuggeſtion, *Deut.* xiii. 1—4.

74. GOD is not only omniſcient, ſo as to be able to reveal future things; but alſo true and faithful, to fulfil them: The iſſue therefore muſt verify divine dreams. Yet with this diſtinction, that dreams intended for inſtruction have their infallible completion; but the monitory and comminatory are always with this condition; that

that their accompliſhment ſhall happen, if men change not their conduct: And thus with the amendment of their lives, the execution of the threatning is ſtayed, *Gen.* xx. 3. 17.

75. All God's works are in mutual harmony and connection together; and therefore a divine dream muſt have nothing contradictory to any actual created being: Yet this I underſtand of its completion, which may have a quite different relation to other things, from what the dream has in itſelf. Thus Joſeph's dream ſeemed contradictory § 71, and the fulfilment of it was nothing leſs. But if a divine dream muſt be without an extrinſic contradiction, much more without an intrinſic; yet alſo in the fulfilment only. For, though it be impoſſible for one cow to eat up another alive; much more for one ear of corn to eat up another: Yet the interpretation of theſe dreams, *Gen.* xli. 29, 30, is not impoſſible, either in itſelf, or in its connection with other things: And actually happened, according to Joſeph's interpretation.

76. THE characteriſtics hitherto aſſigned are, without diſtinction, peculiar to all divine dreams. But as divine dreams are not all of the ſame ſpecies, we muſt, beſides, aſſign thoſe characteriſtics, by which one ſpecies differs from another: And in order the more properly to do this, we are firſt to aſſign the ſpecies themſelves, and point out the grounds of their difference.

77. THE end of divine dreams, with reſpect to men, is the promoting their happineſs, § 73. But as men live not all at one time, but muſt be in a continual ſucceſſion to one another down to the end of the world; and as God is ſo gracious, as to be inclined to promote their happineſs, § 72; he muſt either repeat, from time to time, the ſeveral inſtructions and warnings already communicated to others in dreams; or permit the firſt dreams to be recorded for the benefit of poſterity. And thus Divine or Supernatural dreams come to reſpect as well the preſent, as future

generations; and ſuch are the dreams that regard our eternal happineſs. But God can alſo reveal the fate of ſeveral, or of ſingle perſons, which is a proof of his providence and wiſe government of the world. All theſe dreams muſt ſuit the circumſtances of thoſe, for whoſe welfare they are intended; and thus each particular ſpecies has its peculiar characteriſtic, by which we may judge concerning it.

78. DREAMS, which have the eternal happineſs of men for their end, muſt not only have the general characteriſtics of the Divine, but alſo of the peculiar ones, in order to maintain their credit and authority with poſterity, and convince them, that they are derived immediately from God, and contain and reveal important truths. Such we find in the dreams recorded in the revelation of Chriſtians: And this I will take upon me to evince.

79. ALL natural dreams ariſe not till after deep ſleep, § 5 and 57. But as God can act immediately, and impreſs thoughts

Abraham



upon our ſoul, he can alſo excite dreams in the deep ſleep of the body. Such was *Abraham*'s dream, *Gen.* xv. 12, &c. who fell aſleep at ſun-ſet, perceived and heard in deep ſleep, what we read from *ver.* 12, to the end of *ver.* 16. After the twilight was ended, and the night came on, there offered to him what ſtands *ver.* 17, &c. It has thus its peculiar divine character, that it began in deep ſleep (which cannot be the caſe naturally) though perhaps it ended after. For, in the interval between ſun-ſet and dark night, *Abraham* might have ended his dream.

80. If a ſupernatural dream begins not in deep ſleep, yet it has another characteriſtic, which is a peculiar proof of its divine original. Dreams exhibit abſent objects, § 6; yea, in a dream that has a natural beginning, we repreſent to ourſelves the preſent cauſe thereof different from what it actually is, and under the image of an abſent thing, § 37. In divine dreams, preſent and abſent things are often combined together. God, who ſpoke to

Jacob's Dream



*Abraham*, was preſent to him; the voice abſent, which he imagined he heard, and pronounced the words recorded. For, either he would not have heard, in deep ſleep, and underſtood the voice ſpeaking to him, or we muſt ſuppoſe him awaked out of deep ſleep. And thus God imprinted the words, which he imagined he heard, on his ſoul. The ſmoking furnace was abſent, but doubtleſs an actual flame of fire, as the viſible ſignal of the gracious preſence of God, *Exod.* xiii. 22, paſſed between the pieces of the divided beaſts, and conſumed, if not all, yet the undivided birds, as a burnt offering, *Levit.* i. 14. For thereby *Abraham* obtained the confirmation of the covenant, that his ſeed ſhould poſſeſs the land of *Canaan*. Compare *Jer.* xxxiv. 18, with this laſt part of the dream; and the reaſon, why God paſſed in the flame of fire between the pieces, will be evident. The like holds of *Jacob*'s dream, *Gen.* xxviii. 12, &c. The ladder was abſent, the Angels and God ſpeaking to him, preſent, though an external voice as little ſpoke to *Jacob*, as to *Abraham*.

For, though it cannot be ſhewn, that *Jacob* dreamed in deep ſleep, yet a voice, which ſhould only ſpeak from the clouds, and be underſtood on earth, muſt have been heard by more than one perſon; tho' the perſon, to whom it was directed, was at a conſiderable diſtance off. But doubtleſs the ladder ſeemed to *Jacob* to reach above the clouds: And ſo a voice, ſpeaking from the top thereof, muſt have made a ſtill greater impreſſion; but which was unneceſſary for the purpoſe of *Jacob*'s dream. And who but God alone can act on the ſoul, united with the body? And ſo this alſo is a peculiar characteriſtic of divine Dreams.

81. DIVINE dreams are as little free from confuſion, § 68, as the natural; neither does our underſtanding form in them any judgment about the truth of the images exhibited. Thus *Jacob*, during his dream, certainly paſſed no judgment, whether a ladder, reaching up to Heaven, could be executed or not. Let the dream, recorded *Dan.* iv. 7, &c. be alſo read; in which the combination of images, actu-

ally not poſſible ſo to exiſt, is perplexed and confuſed. Yet the King, when awake, does not at once form a right judgment about it, but *Daniel* is made to give the interpretation: Much leſs could the king form a judgment about it in his ſleep. But though the images be confuſedly combined, yet their connexion in the interpretation is regular, juſt, and true: Let but the interpretation in the paſſage quoted be read, and *John* i. 5, compared with *Jacob*'s ladder, and the truth of the propoſition will be evident. And thus we have a freſh characteriſtic of divine dreams, ſuch as holds not in the natural; unleſs in an Angelical, and mediately deriving from God.

82. DIVINE dreams are indeed alſo combined of images, we had formerly by ſenſation, and imprinted on the imaginative faculty, § 69. But they are ſo little tied to the law of imagination, § 10, that it is rather a particular characteriſtic of their divine origin, if in their connexion they are inexplicable by the law of the imagination. Thus it holds of the words

in *Abraham*'s dream, *Gen.* xv. 13, &c. *Jacob*'s, *Gen.* xxviii. 13—15, and others. But yet the concurrence of all the characteriſtics, above-aſſigned, is no ways neceſſary in one ſingle dream: A ſingle one as well ſhews its divine original, as if they all concurred.

83. A DIVINE dream has this in common with the Angelical, never to be obſcure, but lively in its repreſentations, § 70. But hence it follows not that its ſignification muſt be diſtinctly underſtood, either by the dreaming perſon himſelf, or by others; but it may remain altogether unintelligible till the completion, as appears *Dan.* xii. 4. 8, 9. And thus if it has other characteriſtics of a ſupernatural dream, it loſes nothing in point of credit or authority, whether it be preſently underſtood or not: As it may reſpect far diſtant times, and may come to be diſtinct and intelligible enough to poſterity upon the accompliſhment.

84. God excites dreams, in order to warn or to inſtruct as well preſent as future generations, § 77. Such as regard the preſent, need no peculiar marks of divine original; it is ſufficient that they have the general characteriſtics, adduced § 67--75. Only it is neceſſary that they be underſtood by the preſent generation; otherwiſe with reſpect to them, they would fail to reach their end: A thought we are by no means to entertain of God.

85. Divine dreams, having a preſent reſpect to perſons, have it either to the perſon dreaming, *Gen.* xx. 3. *Dan.* iv. 19; or to ſeveral perſons at the ſame time. And particular perſons are as little to underſtand their own dreams, *Gen.* xl. 8, as each particular perſon is to dream of what regards all in general. In the firſt caſe God may raiſe up a *Joſeph*, or a *Daniel*; and in the laſt, it ſufficeth, if the fate of a whole community be revealed by dreams, and their juſt interpretation, to one principal perſon. *Pharaoh*'s dream had reſpect

Pharaoh's Dream
Plenty & Dearth



to the temporal welfare of all his ſubjects; for which none could better provide than the king; and therefore the coming years of plenty, with thoſe of dearth to follow upon them, were revealed to the king, and by *Joſeph*'s advice the neceſſary meaſures taken, beſt ſuited to promote the benefit of the whole country. But that God ſhould mediately by *Joſeph* reveal the interpretation to the king, was an inſtance of infinite wiſdom. For, thereby *Joſeph* came to that exaltation he himſelf had formerly dreamed of; and at the ſame time to be an inſtrument of preſerving both his father's family, and the Egyptians. And thus God by one ſingle mean brought about ſuch different ends, as could not be accompliſhed in the ſame manner by any created wiſdom. The ſame holds of *Daniel*, Chap. ii. ver. 47, 48.

86. TRUE it is, dreams, excited by God, are not tied to the law of imagination: But then neither do they unneceſſarily depart therefrom, § 82. 69. And when they thus happen in conformity to the law

of the imagination, the queſtion will be, how to diſtinguiſh them from natural dreams? eſpecially if they regard perſons now living, and have only ſome general characteriſtics. Such dreams, however, have more than one diſtinguiſhing mark, by which to convince the dreaming perſons themſelves of their divine original. For either they have 1. an extraordinary degree of livelineſs, ſo as to prevent the dreaming perſon from forgetting them; or the perſon is directly put upon action. Such *Witſius* relates in his *Miſcell. Sacr. lib.* I. *c.* V. from a letter of *Gretius*; namely, that a perſon living near the ramparts of *Landrecy* was admoniſhed in a dream to be upon his guard againſt the enemy's ſpringing a mine; and that he was ſcarce gone from the ſpot, when it was blown up into the air. Another dreamed of ſome Greek words, which indeed himſelf underſtood not; but writing them down in French, as they ſounded, *almaſius* told him what they meant; upon which the perſon quitted his houſe, and the night following it fell down. Or 2.

they are repeated more than once with the ſame, or ſimilar circumſtances: See *Pharaoh*'s dream *Gen.* xli. 25, as alſo the well known dream of the Elector of *Saxony* at the beginning of the reformation, above 245 years ago. Or 3. they often diſcloſe things, not founded on any antecedent natural cauſes, but entirely ariſing from, and depending on the free actions of ſeveral perſons. Such neither our own imagination, nor a created ſpirit can readily ſuggeſt, and previouſly declare, without a divine revelation.

87. All natural dreams bring a laſſitude on the body, roufed out of deep ſleep, § 64. But in ſupernatural dreams God can immediately act on the ſoul, § 79. This circumſtance may alſo convince dreaming perſons of the divine original of their dreams; if, upon dreaming, the body is ſenſible of no degree of laſſitude, but rather of vivacity, and ſprightlineſs: Tho' I aſſign not this as certain, but only as probable; not as a diſtinguiſhing mark of divine dreams, but only of ſuch as depart

from the law of the imagination; I therefore obtrude it not as certain on the reader.

88. SUPERNATURAL dreams can only ariſe from the power of God, § 65. But God can reveal ſomething to good angels, which he may permit them to diſcloſe to men in Dreams. In this caſe, ſuch a dream has all the characteriſtics of a divine dream, and nothing diſtinct from it; unleſs the angel declare himſelf the author thereof. And this, doubtleſs, is the reaſon, why angelick dreams are almoſt generally accounted to the claſs of ſupernatural; to which, notwithſtanding, in regard to origin, they neither belong, nor ever have the peculiar characteriſtics of a divine original; tho' in a larger ſenſe they may be denominated divine: If we call divine, whatever is done at the command of God, and conſiſtently with his perfections and works. It is however unneceſſary for us to enter upon any curious diſquiſition, whether a dream be angelical or ſupernatural; ſeeing both of them, as to contents,

are morally good, and have a good tendency or end.

89. To conclude this chapter, an objection offers, which I muſt reſolve and properly refute. And it is this: The devil can transform himſelf into an angel of light, alſo diſcloſe future events, which as the Scripture itſelf admits, come to have their accompliſhment, *Deut.* xiii. 1, 2. What man can in this caſe be ſure, that he is not deceived by a dream, and made unhappy thereby? But let a perſon only examine his Dream with care, and he will certainly diſcover a mark of its being diabolical, §. 61, and in it a want of the general characteriſtics of divine dreams, § 67, &c. And even in the prediction of future events, tho' they come to be accompliſhed, we may diſcover ſome traces of a diabolical deception. Let us but conſider the following circumſtances: 1. The devil can reveal things future, nay things apparently wonderful. But 2, they are the natural conſequences of pre-exiſting cauſes, and are generally founded

on the preſent circumſtances of ſome one perſon or other. And 3. in reſpect of time, are not too remote: Whereas on the contrary, the Devil is incapable of revealing things diſtant as to time, and not founded on preſent exiſting cauſes and circumſtances. He is indeed a ſagacious, but yet a limited ſpirit; and therefore cannot take a ſurvey of undetermined or contingent conſequences, depending on the actions of free agents, and aſſign them as certain at a remote period of time. I know a perſon, ſtill living, who ſome years ſince was haunted night and day, by a phantom or ſpectre unknown to her, and ſolicited to take up a hidden treaſure." The phantom called God the Almighty, and aſſured her that he would not ſuffer the Prince, the appellation it always gave the Devil, to do her any harm. In order to accompliſh its deſign, it pretended that it was neceſſary to name a certain man's name. Upon the perſon's alledging as an excuſe, that the name might be eaſily forgotten, eſpecially if any thing frightful ſhould appear on the ſpot, where the treaſure lay, the anſwer was.

She ſhould be allowed to write it down, or if ſhe could not write herſelf, get ſome other to do it, yet ſo as not to omit a ſingle letter. But to prevent the giving any ſuſpicion, upon the name being deſired to be written down, this mimic of God named a woman of the place with child, who in a month's time was to bring into the world a ſon, and give him the ſaid name; on which occaſion the name might be written down as a matter of curioſity. The child came into the world at the time aſſigned, proved to be a ſon, and had the aforeſaid name given him, and is ſtill living with his mother. It is true, this happened to a perſon awake, but it explains ſo much the better the circumſtances aſſigned in the above propoſitions. The event was future, and appears extraordinary. But are there not probable ſigns, by which to form a conjecture, whether a child in the womb ſhall prove male or female, and would the oldeſt enquirer extant into nature be unacquainted with theſe ſigns? Might not the parents diſcourſe together concerning the approaching birth, chooſe god-fathers before

hand, and, according to the cuſtom of the country, have concluded, which of the god-fathers names ſhould be given the child. But I never heard or read, that the Devil infallibly foretold any contingent event, three hundred and fifty years before it happened; as God did in the caſe of *Joſiah*, 1 *Kings* xiii. 2: Or, two hundred years before, as was done in the caſe of *Cyrus*, *Iſ.* xliv. 28. xlv. 1. As I am not now explaining and examining diabolical apparitions, but diabolical dreams, I deem it altogether needleſs to give the reaſons why I aſcribe the above revelation to the Devil.

# SECTION II.

## *Concerning divine revelations by dreams.*

## CHAP. I.

### *The propriety or fitneſs of God's revealing himſelf by Dreams.*

90. I CAN now aſſign a reaſon, why I myſelf, and many thouſand other ſincere Chriſtians believe, that God, not only in former times, revealed himſelf by dreams, and diſcloſed important events to mankind, which alſo were to happen in very diſtant periods of time; but that at this day he ſtill continues to inſtruct and warn mankind by means of dreams. Some dreams there are, which exceed the powers of created beings, § 70—82; and therefore muſt come from God; eſpecially as they are not inconſiſtent with his perfections and works, § 71—75, and depend on the actions of free agents, which none but the omniſcient

God can foreſee, and with certainty declare beforehand, § 86—89.

91. And though we have ſufficient reaſon to admire the manifold wiſdom of God in this manner of revelation; yet unbelieving cenſoriouſneſs is never without ſomething to object, and particularly to revelation by dreams. Divine dreams, they pretend, are difficult to be diſtinguiſhed from natural: And though they might have their peculiar characteriſtics, yet dreams are carefully to be conſidered; and after all, men are apt to be betrayed into ſuperſtition. That ſo unſafe a means as dreams, is neither becoming the wiſdom of God to reveal himſelf by; nor fit to be credited by reaſonable beings. The whole ſtreſs of this objection bears on theſe two queſtions: 1. Whether it be becoming God to reveal himſelf in a manner, which may give occaſion to ſuperſtition? And when he does ſo, 2. Whether it be becoming reaſonable beings to hold and believe them to be divine? I anſwer both in the affir-

mative; and ſhall now undertake to give a rational proof of both.

92. THE propoſition I am to oppoſe to the firſt query, and to prove, is this: If God reſolved to give a nearer or more intimate revelation of himſelf, than he has done in the works of creation, it was becoming him to do it by means of dreams. The notions, contained in this propoſition, and not defined, or not ſufficiently determined, I hold myſelf bound to fix, and diſtinctly and with certainty to lay open their mutual conſiſtency and harmony.

93. To *reveal*, denotes the manifeſting a thing unknown before. That this act admits of degrees, a very ſmall attention may inform us; and ſuch degrees I alſo obſerve in the divine procedure. For, by the works of creation, as we may diſcover and find him out in them, God has revealed to rational beings his concealed and unknown nature. This revelation affirms, *Rom.* i. 19, 20. *Acts* xvii. 27: And this, the whole of natural religion,

in concert and agreement therewith, ſhews. Yet God could not make known all the perfections of his nature by the creation; otherwiſe the world would in its whole extent be like to himſelf, and conſequently a created God; which is a real contradiction, and therefore impoſſible. But whatever is not held forth to us in the works of creation, God can reveal in another manner. And whatever is revealed concerning God otherwiſe than by the works of the creation, I call a nearer or more intimate revelation; and among other poſſible methods of imparting a revelation, I account that by means of dreams to be a work befitting God.

94. An action of a rational being, which is in concert and harmony with its active powers (i. e. which contains ſuch indications as ſhew whence it takes it riſe) and is in conſiſtence with the end it was deſigned to bring about, is ſuch as is befitting that being. That is unbefitting or unbecoming, which is in oppoſition to the end, and bewrays the weakneſs, or ill ap-

plication of the active powers of that being. And thus, it is unbefitting a learned man to receive idle tales for real matters of fact, and obtrude them as facts on others. For hence it appears, what little improvement he hath made of his underſtanding, or at leaſt how wantonly he miſapplies it in ſuch inſtances. But befitting it is, when he can diſtinguiſh and diſcover falſehood from truth.

95. MEN, indeed, may act in an unbefitting manner, as their powers are limited; and they actually do ſo; as there is none who one time or other hath not been guilty of ſomething unbefitting. But God can never act but in a befitting and becoming manner, as his power is infinite, and without bounds. I know it may be objected, that, according to the conceſſion of ſome divines, God does not always exert his power with an equal diſplay thereof; as in the putting a ſtop to moral evil, and in promoting moral good by the converſion of men: but this objection is by no means an exception to the propoſition I maintain:

For, only possible actions are befitting or unbefitting; but impossible, not so. Who ever thought, that it was unbefitting a learned person not to know every thing without exception, and to be able to assign the causes or reasons thereof? This exceeds the compass of his understanding, and is a thing impossible for him on account of his limited powers. But unbefitting him it is, not to know what he might have known; especially in that branch of science he hath particularly made choice of, and which he ought to know; as there are principles extant, on which he might proceed, and indeed such as are generally and sufficiently known. And thus it would be unbecoming a divine, not to know, and be able to maintain this proposition, that God cannot act in an unbefitting manner; as this flows from the infinite perfections of the divine Being: and the objection may be taken off or removed, on this consideration, that the works of God cannot be infinite, as he himself is in nature and power. Could God produce any thing without himself, or *ad extra*, perfectly

equal to himſelf, it would be a created God, that is, a contradiction, and conſequently impoſſible. I expreſsly ſay, *without him*, as in ſupernatural or revealed religion we maintain the communication of the divine nature to more than one perſon; but which belongs not to the works produced by God without him or *ad extra*. What God produces without him, he is indeed the efficient cauſe of; but ſuch a cauſe, with which the effect is not of a like ſpecies and nature, and called in Ontology the *equivocal cauſe*. Theſe effects of God are naturally limited by each other; and to this head belongs the divine operation in putting a bar to moral evil, and in promoting moral good. Were God to operate according to his infinite power, he would deſtroy the freedom of rational creatures, by which they reſiſt the ſaid operation. And as it belongs to the eſſence of a ſpirit, and is imparted thereto in creation, God cannot act in contradiction thereto; ſo as to put a bar to evil, and promote moral good, by a diſplay of Almighty power. And thus God acts in

this reſpect in a befitting manner; ſeeing what is poſſible from the conſideration of his power, becomes impoſſible from the conſideration of an external cauſe, which owes its origin to himſelf: And this limitation is no mark of any weakneſs, or miſapplication of power, but of a wiſe diſplay thereof; in regard no one operation of God deſtroys another, but all are ſo diſpoſed and regulated in their connections as to produce one general end.

96. WHATEVER therefore is befitting God, muſt be in conſiſtence with, and by no means in contradiction to, the diſplay of his perfections. It would be as ſuperfluous, as endleſs a taſk, to ſhew that revelations by dreams are no wiſe inconſiſtent with each divine perfection in particular. And therefore only with reſpect to ſuch perfections, as have a proximate relation to this ſpecies of revelation, I ſhall undertake to ſhew its fitneſs and propriety: And I flatter myſelf, that whoever conſiders what I advance without prejudice, will have no ſcruples to raiſe as to the other perfections of God.

97. THE holineſs, wiſdom, power, and goodneſs of God are the perfections, which offer themſelves here to our conſideration, in preference to the others. For, the holineſs of God ſets him at a wide remove from all moral evil: His wiſdom exhibits the motives for which, among all the poſſible methods of revelation, he makes choice of dreams: As a wiſe perſon, and leaſt of all the all-wiſe God, never does any thing without a reaſon. His power executes what his wiſdom chooſes; and his goodneſs has an eye to the greateſt poſſible good of thoſe creatures he is pleaſed to reveal himſelf to.

98. GOD is holy, as he is ſeparate or removed from all moral evil. But as all divine dreams, both as to their contents or ſubject, and their end, are morally good, § 72, the revelation, made by their means, can never be in contradiction to his holineſs.

99. To attempt to juſtify the wiſdom of God in all his operations, is, indeed, a

highly difficult taſk: *Who hath known the mind of the Lord? Or who hath been his counſellor?* And therefore we are bound, with humble admiration, to adore many things which are too high and incomprehenſible for finite creatures, as we are. And I am very far from imagining I can aſſign all the reaſons in vindication of dreams only; and why it pleaſed God to reveal himſelf by means of them: However, ſo much I hope to advance, as ſhall be ſufficient to ſhew their fitneſs or propriety in regard to this perfection of God. We account a perſon wiſe, who knows how to make choice of the fitteſt means, in order to obtain the end intended. God's end in all his works, is the diſplay of his perfections to rational creatures, and by this diſplay to promote his own glory. To this alſo divine dreams have a tendency, § 73; and a fitneſs to attain this end. For in ſleep our ſoul has no ſenſation of the objects preſent to our body, § 6; but is only employed about what ſhe dreams of. Now as ſhe is at the ſame time ſet free from the paſſions, excited by the ſenſa-

tions, ariſing in the ſtate of being awake; as in ſleep the underſtanding neither forms any judgment, nor inclines the will to make any free choice, § 48; ſhe at that time is more ſuſceptible than at any other, of receiving whatever is exhibited to her; eſpecially as the imagination is more lively when we dream than when we are awake. 2. If God entertains thoughts about us, when conſcious neither of him, nor of ourſelves, § 4, and makes it his care to warn us of diſaſters, or to promote our happineſs, § 73; he is therefore omniſcient, omnipreſent, and all gracious. And 3. We are thereby excited inceſſantly to employ ourſelves in good and holy meditations; in order not to diſqualify ourſelves by evil thoughts for the gracious preſence and operations of God. And 4. If God inſtructs us at a time when our underſtanding and will, as well as our paſſions, are laid aſleep, and at reſt: This may ſerve to teach us, that we are duly to conſider his revelations, in a calm ſtate of mind, and then without precipitation paſs a judgment upon them.

100. BUT that God has otherwiſe in various manners revealed himſelf, and ſpoken to the fathers by his prophets, but laſt of all by his ſon and the Apoſtles, is a freſh inſtance of his Wiſdom, as being provided with far more numerous means for obtaining one and the ſame end, than the wiſdom of the creatures can ever deviſe and employ.

101. THE power of God manifeſts itſelf, not only when it excites dreams in deep ſleep, which none beſides can effect, § 79; but alſo hereby, that in a ſtate, which is naturally full of confuſion and untruth, § 7; yet makes known important truths to men, and gives a ſtrong conviction of them.

102. DIVINE revelation by dreams has, with reſpect to men, their inſtruction in view, § 77. That this ſhould be effected in a diſtinct and convincing manner, is what is ſuitable to the divine goodneſs; according to which he communicates to

the creatures as much good, as each in his ſeveral ſtate is ſuſceptible of. Now when divine dreams are lively, § 70, and have other divine characteriſtics, I ſee not why they ſhould not be as convincing as thoſe revelations made to perſons awake, and conſequently be alſo in nothing unbefitting the divine goodneſs: Rather God is thereby glorified, that is, his perfections are as diſtinctly manifeſted, as ever they could poſſibly be to perſons awake.

103. IF it is no ways inconſiſtent with the divine perfections, that he ſhould reveal himſelf by dreams; yet, perhaps, as is objected farther, there may be ſomething unbefitting in dreams themſelves, on which account God cannot make choice of them as a means of revelation: They are, you allow, ſay they, full of confuſion, § 7, and even divine dreams themſelves are not quite free of it, § 68; nor does the revelation, which Chriſtians receive, judge very favourably of dreams: According to *Solomon*, Eccleſ. v. 7, *in the multitude of dreams there are alſo divers vanities.* If all Chri-

ſtians receive not the book of *Syrach*, as divinely inſpired, yet they deem the author to have been a wiſe man; but he writes, Chap. xxxiv. ver. 1—4. *Dreams lift up fools: Whoſo regardeth dreams is like him that catcheth at a ſhadow, and followeth after the wind. Dreams are nothing other, but images without ſubſtance. Of an unclean thing, what can be cleanſed? And from that which is falſe, what truth can come?* Pity it is, perhaps, that the objection is not ſo ſtrong, as at firſt ſight it may appear to be. It may be more ſhortly anſwered, than it is propoſed: Let but the reader turn back to § 68 and 81. But *Solomon* and *Syrach* may be made to anſwer themſelves; *Eccleſ.* v. 3, it is ſaid, *a dream cometh through the multitude of buſineſs:* This happens naturally; and therefore in the above-quoted ver. 7, natural dreams muſt be alſo intended, as the entire connexion ſhews this. But this charge holds not good of divine dreams, which are of another ſpecies. As to *Syrach*, let but the reader pleaſe to conſult the immediately following words ver. 5. *Divinations and*

*ſooth ſayings, and dreams are vain,* (which was alſo remarked, § 53) *and the heart fancieth, as a woman's heart in travail,* and no further refutation will be neceſſary. And whenever a dream happens not by the inſpiration of the Moſt High, be ſure you make no account of it: For dreams deceive many people; and diſappoint thoſe who depend upon them.

104. IF you ſtill inſiſt, that divine dreams, however, are dark and uncertain in their ſignification: this can hold only of ſuch as reveal very diſtant things: And what impropriety can there be in that? So at the due and appointed time, we obtain their diſtinct ſignification by means of their completion, § 74. 83. Such dreams as regard events near at hand, are of a different nature, § 84. And thus there is nothing unbefitting in making uſe of dreams for the purpoſes of a divine revelation.

105. To object, that we can have no certainty whether a dream be from God, as

its ſignification is obſcure, § 83, and the preſence of ſome things aſſumed, § 80, as offering in divine dreams, is difficult to be proved; all this is of no greater weight than what we have already confuted: For the event has ſhewn in the dreams recorded by Scripture, that none but God could ſuggeſt the revelation contained in them. They had their accompliſhment notwithſtanding the vaſt number of free and ſpontaneous actions of men, that muſt have intervened and contributed to their completion.

106. To conclude; it ſeems, ſay they, to be unbefitting God, to chooſe a mean for the inſtruction of mankind, which the Devil, according to the conceſſion of Chriſtian divines, may equally avail himſelf of, in order to deceive. But it only ſeems ſo: For, though I readily grant, that the Devil mimicks God, and at times reveals himſelf to idolaters in one or other inſtance by means of dreams; yet the difference between Divine and Diabolical revelations remains entirely diſtinct, as

was ſhewn § 89. And if every thing, that the Devil mimicks, were unbeſeeming God, he muſt diſcharge his rational creatures all adoration of himſelf, as in this reſpect the Devil moſt of all exerts himſelf to mimick God, *Mat.* iv. 9. But why God ſhould permit ſuch mimickry, as the Devil is ſubject to his power and dominion, is diſtinctly mentioned, *Deut.* xiii. 3. It now remains a certain truth, that it is beſeeming God to reveal himſelf by dreams; I haſten now to diſcuſs the reaſonableneſs of giving credit to a divine revelation by dreams.

## CHAP. II.

### *The reaſonableneſs of accounting a revelation, made by means of Dreams, to be Divine.*

107. REASON is that faculty of our ſoul, which diſcovers general truths and their mutual connexions: The ſame appellation we alſo apply to the mutual connexions of the truths themſelves. And thus *rational* muſt be that, which is conſiſtent with general, known truths; as *irrational* is that, which actually contradicts general truths. But what is there more general than the notions of *poſſible* and *actual?* And what more known than theſe? For, even the moſt ſimple perſons have, if not diſtinct and compleat, yet at leaſt obſcure notions of them, and form a judgment from them. If a divine revelation by dreams conſpires and coincides with heſe notions, it is alſo rational; but if contradictory to, and ſubverſive of them, it

would then be irrational and to be rejected; as God, the author of all truth, neither has, nor ever can produce any thing contradictory, § 71.

108. WERE the revelation by dreams irrational, there muſt be 1. either an intrinſic contradiction between the notions of revelation, and of dreams: Or 2. extrinſic, between the revelation by dreams and the revealing God; or the revelation by dreams and the dreaming man. But that this is not the caſe, may be eaſily ſhewn.

109. THE ſtate, in which we, indeed, think, but are not diſtinctly conſcious of ourſelves, is called a *dream*, § 5. *Revelation*, a diſcovery of ſomething unknown, § 93: Where lies the contradiction between theſe notions? They are rather conſentaneous; for the thinking faculty of our ſoul dreams: But as ſhe is capable of thinking, ſo is ſhe alſo of taking in, and retaining things otherwiſe unknown, under known images or words; alſo afterwards, when awake, of forming a judgment about

them. To ſay, that in deep ſleep we have no ſelf-conſciouſneſs, § 4; and yet to maintain, that divine dreams may ariſe in deep ſleep, § 79, is as little any real contradiction; ſeeing the body, not the ſoul, is aſleep, § 34, and therefore ſhe is capable of taking in, and retaining the divine operations by a dream, even in deep ſleep.

110. THAT it is becoming God, that is, conſiſtent with his perfections and glory, to reveal himſelf by dreams, has been proved in the preceeding chapter, § 98—102; that alſo in dreams themſelves there is nothing unbecoming, was ſufficiently ſhewn, § 103—106. That God may continually have ſomething unknown to manifeſt to us, none can take upon him to deny; as the end of dreams is to inſtruct men in coming or future good things, and warn them againſt future diſaſters, § 73. And who can deny the infinite God's knowing, in virtue of his omniſcience, all future events, though at preſent lying concealed? or that his power extends over the laws of nature,

or his being able to alter them, and act in a different manner from them, that is, ſupernaturally? We allow to every reaſonable artiſt, as ſuppoſe a Clockmaker, an ability to alter his work, prevent its regular going for any time at pleaſure, or entirely to deſtroy it. Should then the grea artiſt of the world be poſſeſſed of leſs power? I can never imagine any one will take upon him to affirm it.

111. DREAMS are, indeed, in themſelves unſubſtantial images, §. 7; but what can ſtand in the way of divine wiſdom and power to prevent giving them a juſt interpretation, as *Gen.* xli; and an actual exiſtence, as *Gen.* xl, and *Dan.* ii, andiv. And hence a revelation by dreams is both intrinſecally and extrinſecally poſſible, §. 108; and it is therefore a rational conduct to receive them as Divine.

112. IF in the notion of a revelation there be no intrinſic contradiction, nor between a dream and God's revealing by dreams; yet perhaps there might in our

ſoul: And yet ſhe dreams naturally, § 5. and 16. And why can not God, who in creation imparted the thinking faculty to the ſoul, as well produce images in her, as ſhe produce them by her own faculty? There is alſo nothing contradictory, nor conſequently irrational, in accounting dreams, poſſeſſed of divine characteriſtics, ſupernatural and divine.

113. As to the purport, or ſubject of divine dreams, it is morally good, § 70. And every one will deem the happineſs of ſoul and body, either of the whole human ſpecies, and of an entire people, or at leaſt of ſingle perſons, who are often appointed as inſtruments to promote the happineſs of many others, of ſuch importance, as that the all-gracious God ſhould manifeſt that happineſs, and reveal the manner how it is to be obtained.

114. AND yet dreams, it may be objected, ſeem not ſuch a ſure medium, for God among other means to uſe for inſtructing mankind. For, not only much

deceit may ariſe, but has actually ariſen about them; when that is deemed divine, which is not ſo; or when ſome have attempted, in order to obtain and facilitate their ends, to obtrude on others for divine, what was nothing leſs than ſuch. The truth of this objection is undeniable, as being demonſtrable from the hiſtory of more than one people. I would not take upon me to vouch for the dream of *Alphonſus* I. of *Portugal*; to which, however, the armorial enſigns of that kingdom owe their origin: He made his army, with which he deſigned to attack five Saracen kings 40,000 men ſtrong, I ſay, he made his army believe, that the preceeding night, the image of the Crucifix appeared to him in the clouds, which promiſed him the victory, and, for confirmation, commanded him to put in his enſigns armorial the thirty pieces of ſilver, for which he was betrayed. For though the king entirely defeated this Saracen army in the year 1139, and took Liſbon from them, at preſent the capital of the kingdom; yet this dream reſembles ſo

much the other fables deviſed in the dark ages of ſuperſtition, that one egg is not more like another. And the ſtory, recorded 2 *Maccab.* xv. 12, &c. appears not ſo credible to me, as it does to the author of that book. Yea, the revelation, which we receive as divine, complains of falſe dreamers, *Jer.* xxiii. 25—32. But ſhall the true and genuine uſe of a thing be diſcontinued, or entirely omitted, on account of its miſapplication? That ſuch a fraud may bring with it many evil conſequences, and has often done ſo, I readily grant. But is it not the fault of thoſe, who ſuffer themſelves to be impoſed upon, that they are actually deceived? I would not chooſe to conſider the reward of unrighteouſneſs and wickedneſs, as the ſureſt pledge which God would and could give me, for the fulfilling of a promiſe, were even the reſt of the dream more of a piece with itſelf than is this circumſtance: And that *Jeremiah* ſhould after his death turn ſoldier, who never had been one in his life-time, and reach *Judas Maccabeus* a conſecrated ſword

of gold, is certainly a waking dream, and not a dream that in ſleep reveals victory. And how came the *Jews* in the days of *Jeremiah* not to examine the dreaming ſpirits; to which, however, they were ſufficiently excited by the true prophets? The reaſon is, they were fond of lies and vanity; otherwiſe, if not the common people, yet the prieſts could have learned out of the law, that together with the true prophets, it denounced a curſe againſt the prevailing impieties; but with the falſe dreamers it announced a bleſſing. And as they did not chooſe to know this, they ſuffered themſelves, through their own default, to be deceived, though they might otherwiſe have avoided it.

115. WERE all this admitted as true, it is ſtill urged, that yet the revelation by dreams could hardly acquit itſelf of affording a ſupport to ſuperſtition. For not to loſe the benefit of them, dreams muſt be obſerved in the moſt accurate manner poſſible, and their ſignification can-

vaſſed. This is not ſo great a difficulty, as that it cannot be removed. Superſtition conſiſts herein; namely, in falſely aſcribing a power or virtue to a thing, which according to its nature it cannot have. And thus it is ſuperſtition, when the ſound or figure of certain letters ſhall be made to quench fire, heal diſeaſes and wounds, or perform ſtill greater things. Now if the revelation by dreams affords a ſupport to ſuperſtition, ſomething muſt be falſely aſcribed to dreams, which is contradictory to their nature. Where ſhall this be found? Poſſibly it may conſiſt in the notices or ſignifications of divine dreams, and one may imagine, that ſeeing domeſtic dreams denote or ſignify nothing, § 53 the ſame ſhall alſo hold of all other ſpecies of dreams. Such a determination is groundleſs, as a dream may certainly be ſignificative or preſaging, and many of them abſolutely are ſo; ſince the notion of a ſignificative dream is conſiſtent, and the fulfilment of ſome dreams eſtabliſhes their actual ſignification.

116. I CALL *ſignificative*, or preſaging, whatever is effected for ſome certain end, § 54. Who can doubt, but that the collective body of ſpirits without us, and in particular the uncreated and all-wiſe ſpirit, God, does, and can, for ſome certain ends, excite dreams: And if this is not the caſe, I would beg to have it explained, whence the dreams, mentioned § 86. ariſe. But if the ſhort anſwer be, to deny the whole, and ſay, that they were fulfilled by chance; I muſt be allowed to ſay, that I account the perſons who ſay ſo, to be men of a different make and nature from others, and reckon it a doubt whether they do not appear to be men, and yet at the ſame time are without the principal property of men, reaſon. We ſhall however hereafter, § 144. lay open the ſource of ſuperſtition.

# SECTION III.

## *The Morality of Dreams.*

## CHAP. I.

### *The moral purport, and the imputation of Dreams.*

317. WE have a two-fold faculty or power, that of thinking, peculiar to the ſoul, and that of motion, to the body, § 3. The effects of theſe powers are denominated *actions*. Some of theſe actions ariſe without a preceeding will and reflection, and are continued or carried on, without our thought and conſciouſneſs: Such is the bare repreſentation in the ſoul of an object acting upon us; the circulation of the blood, and the motion of the heart connected therewith; the concoction of the ſtomach, and other actions in the body. And theſe are called *natural actions*; as the former ariſe from the innate repreſentative power or force of the ſoul; the latter, from the com-

poſition or conſtruction of the body and its parts, and a force implanted therein. Other actions depend on the faculty of willing and nilling of the ſoul, and accurately harmonize therewith. Theſe laſt are called *free* or *ſpontaneous actions*.

118. FREE actions are attended with many conſequences, which either improve or debaſe both our internal and external ſtate. If the former be the conſequence, ſuch actions are good: If the latter, bad. The improvement of our ſtate is a motive, which impels the will to chooſe, and to do that which contributes to this improvement: As the debaſement of our ſtate, is a motive to omit what may ſerve to further that debaſement.

119. THE connection of the motives with the actions, conſtitutes the *obligation*, to act or not to act. And from the obligation ariſes a law. All free actions, § 117. are thus, on account of their conſequences, conformable or unconformable to a law, and we are obliged to do the good,

and omit the evil. But good or bad, is in one word denominated *moral*; and thus all free actions are moral, as they are either good or bad, § 118.

120. ACTIONS are effects, which ariſe from our faculties or powers, § 117. Dreams ariſe from our thinking faculty, and in particular from the imagination, vide § 11. And hence they belong to the actions of our ſoul. But a ſcruple may readily ariſe, whether they are free, and ſubject to a moral determination, as during a dream, the underſtanding and free choice of the will, depending thereon, do not manifeſt themſelves, § 48. And yet only free actions are moral, § 116. But the *domeſtic*, § 17. ariſe from our waking thoughts, or from the ſtate of the body, § 18. The waking thoughts, from which they ariſe, are animated or influenced by our attention, § 19. The ſtate of the body ariſes from preceeding free actions, § 35. Foreign dreams, § 40. as to their origin, are free actions of a ſpirit without us: And hence all dreams, without exception, are in their

origin free actions; and as their cauſes are either good or bad, ſuch alſo is their nature, and conſequently entirely moral.

121. THEY become ſtill more moral by their purport or ſubject; as the domeſtic are regulated by our inclination, § 20. and in conformity to them the images are put together; or reſemble the ſtate of the body, § 35. But foreign, § 40. have beſides a certain end and ſignification, § 55. which is either morally good or morally evil. But as the knowledge of the morality of our dreams, ſerves to promote the improvement of our will, we will ſomewhat more accurately conſider it.

122. FROM the conſequences, we determine the morality of actions, § 118. and though domeſtic dreams, it is objected, ariſe from free actions, § 120. yet they are inſignificative, or un-preſaging, § 53. and without any conſequence or end; and therefore muſt, doubtleſs, be without any morality, and paſs neither for good nor bad. I grant, indeed, that do-

meſtic dreams are without any neceſſary conſequence; and as the underſtanding exerts itſelf neither in their origin nor progreſs, are without any end, and conſequently inſignificative. In particular, no conſequence can ariſe from ſuch an obſcure repreſentation, § 8. as that we know not what we dreamt of. But we have as many, if not more lively than obſcure dreams. When awake, we recollect the ſubject of our lively dreams; and then they may not only draw conſequences after them, but actually do ſo, more than enough; when we either rejoice in, are troubled at, or quite overwhelmed with their ſubject, or purport, whether they do or do not happen to be preſaging. Thus a man, who was married a ſecond time, dreamed, that his late wife wanted violently to force away the wife that lay by him, and lay herſelf in her place. But as ſhe could not effect this, ſhe with a ſtern countenance went to the door of the room, and ſaid; I ſhall ſoon find a remedy; and violently pulled the door after her. Upon this the man waked, continued much de-

jected for ſeveral weeks, interpreted the dream to his friends as a preſage of his approaching death, and ſoon after actually died. In this dream, I find all the characteriſtics of a domeſtic dream, except its completion. But may not that be the conſequence of his melancholy or dejection, rather than of the dream itſelf? And how important was this conſequence? Not to mention ſuch as have recourſe to fooliſh, ſuperſtitious books of dreams, and want to draw from them a neceſſary preſage. And have we not therefore reaſon to examine our dreams, and paſs a moral judgment upon them?

123. MOREOVER we often dream of indifferent things: We imagine ourſelves on a journey, but know not whence or whither, tire ourſelves, and at length are frightened at a phantom that is in purſuit of us. At another time we come into a certain place, among perſons in whoſe company we amuſe ourſelves with ſubjects of no moral goodneſs. From this there ariſe ſeveral conſequences in the body,

which coincide with the thoughts excited by the dream. And hence dreams are in themſelves altogether good or bad; and entirely moral in the mutual connection of their images.

124. DREAMS, excited by other bodies acting on ours, § 37. admit of no exception. For, the imagination never exhibits the body that acts upon us, but ſomething different; and with this laſt according to the peculiar law thereof, connects falſe images, reſembling other repreſentations which we formerly had, and conſtitutes their purport or contents moral.

125. DREAMS, ariſing from created ſpirits without us, do not always, indeed, attain their end, § 38. But yet they are rarely without conſequences. Thus we often dream at firſt of indifferent things, but at laſt the dream ends in ſome extraordinary terror or fright, which the waking repreſentation of the things dreamed of, would not have excited in ſo violent a degree; ſeeing it often continues to make

the body, when quite awake, to ſhudder; nay, it is heightened, when we reflect on the laſt images of the dream. The malicious ſpirit, who miſemploys our imagination, hath doubtleſs attempted to effect more; but not being able, hath at leaſt produced a motion in the brain, which propagated through the nerves, might eaſily prove detrimental to the body. By ſuch detriment our ſtate would become worſe, and therefore ſuch a dream is morally evil.

126. DIVINE dreams inſtruct and warn, and may contain repreſentations, both phyſically good and evil, § 73. In both caſes they have their conſequences, which are always deſigned to improve, if not the external, yet the internal ſtate of man; and therefore are morally good. Thus *Pharaoh*'s dreams, *Gen.* xli. thoſe of his impriſoned ſervants, *Gen.* xl. and even *Joſeph*'s *Gen.* xxxvii. appear to be indifferent: Yet the iſſue ſhewed, that they took their riſe from a cauſe morally good, and were directed for the promoting, if

not abſolutely the temporal, yet the ſpiritual and eternal happineſs of the perſons.

127. But dreams, according to the proofs hitherto advanced, have not only their natural conſequences, obligation, and morality; but beſides, God has given us a law, which extends to our appetites or deſires, and to the firſt judgments we paſs upon any thing in our thoughts, and connects rewards and puniſhments with our actions, as ſanctions or motives to them. Now as dreams are an effect of our thinking faculty, § 11. and alſo of our freedom of action, § 120. they are peculiarly ſubject to the divine law, and according to their quality, we are to expect either rewards or puniſhments.

128. Rewards and puniſhments are conſequences, which the will of the lawgiver connects with moral actions, and can in no other manner be diſpenſed, but in the way of imputation. Now if dreams are to be ſubjected to rewards and puniſh-

ments, § 127. we muſt further conſider this imputation, and ſhew that it takes place in dreams.

129. *To impute*, is to declare a perſon the author of any free action. And the author of ſuch an action, is the perſon, who by his own powers effected or produced it. Thus man is the author of his domeſtic dreams; the Devil, of diabolical; and God, of ſupernatural.

130. ONE may indeed be declared the author of a free action, without being condemned by the law, and without the conſequences, which the law connects with the action, being adjudged to him. Thus an acquaintance and friend might privily take out of my garden a fine gillyflower-ſtock, and as I well know it was miſſing, when my friend was in the garden, I might charge him with it. By this I ſhould actually declare him the author of a theft; as that conſiſts in the purloining or privily taking away another's property: But yet I would not have my friend puniſhed

as a thief. The imputation of a legal conſequence, which is connected with robbing a garden, is here wanting. But as generally the legal conſequences are alſo at the ſame time charged on the author of a free action, this laſt explication or definition of a perſon as the author, may be called a *legal imputation.*

131. THOUGHTS, as long as they are not manifeſted by our words and deeds, and thus dreams alſo, as they conſiſt in thoughts, § 5. paſs free at human tribunals. The reaſon is, becauſe thoughts affect not the public quiet, and are known to no mortal but the thinking perſon himſelf. But the caſe is different as to the bar of our own conſcience, and of the omniſcient God: Before which a legal imputation of all our thoughts, and alſo of our dreams, lies. The proof of both can be no difficult matter; but I ſhall undertake each apart.

132. DREAMS in themſelves are good or bad, § 123. and their conſequences are

things well known. Now if our ſoul excites a dream from her imagination, ſhe alſo conſents to the conſequences thereof, and the conſcience charges them on her with the greateſt juſtice, though the conſequences be not neceſſary, nor is it in our power to dream when we will. For though the conſequences be not neceſſarily connected with each dream, yet they generally take place, § 122. And if we cannot dream when we will, this is a thing that depends not on the freedom of our will, but on the impediments, which the body in deep ſleep lays in the way, § 31. As ſoon as the body recovers out of deep ſleep, the ſoul begins to think and to dream, § 5. and this ſhe does from her own powers; which ſhe freely exerciſes, as ſoon as ſhe can ſurmount the oppoſing obſtacles. Yea, dreams are a proof of the readineſs or habit of our ſoul, to follow rather the law of our imagination, than our faculty of underſtanding, if we are not ever and anon on our guard againſt our thoughts and their mutual connections.

133. AT the bar of God we ſhall be fully convicted, that our thinking powers were ſo created, as to enable us to have a diſtinct knowlege of moral good, and always to chooſe, what would have promoted our real happineſs; and that thro' our own default, they were brought into the preſent ſtate, in which we often paſs wrong judgments, and make evil our choice: That from this corrupt ſtate of the powers of our ſoul, morally evil dreams ought to be derived; and that we are accountable not only for the good we have ſquandered away, but alſo for the conſequences ariſing therefrom, according to which, we find ourſelves deſerving of a legal reward or puniſhment. And who will then clear himſelf from a legal imputation of dreams? But yet we muſt more diſtinctly unfold their circumſtances, as thereon depend the peace of our conſcience, and a part of our happineſs.

134. A PERSON is ſaid to be author of a free action, when he actually effects it by his own powers, § 129. Whether he

admits this of his own knowledge, or is ſufficiently apprized of it by ſome other perſon. We are the authors of all our domeſtic dreams, § 17. And therefore they may not only legally be, but actually are imputed to us; as God has both threatened to avenge the tranſgreſſion of his law, and connected natural evil conſequences therewith.

135. FREE actions, which are not produced by our own powers, are *foreign* to us. And this denomination I applied to the dreams, § 40. which take their riſe from a ſpiritual being without us. But they may become morally ours, by our conſent to them. In how many different ways this may happen, is unneceſſary here to point out, as not all, but only ſome one or other ſpecies of conſent may take place. As ſoon as conſent is given, the action itſelf is imputed to us; ſeeing whoever conſents to the action, conſents at the ſame time to its legal conſequences, and is bound to take them upon himſelf. If we conſent not to it, no foreign

action can be imputed to us, but the morality, and legal imputation thereof, muſt fall to the account of the author who actually produced them.

136. FROM obſcure dreams, it is true, no conſequences can ariſe, § 122. and we cannot paſs a judgment either on their goodneſs or badneſs, as we cannot recollect them. But yet they have one and the ſame origin and laws with the lively, § 11. and it depends not on the freedom of our will, but on the impediment which the ſleeping body cauſes, that we cannot recollect them, and that they thus remain without any conſequences, § 132. And hence, however, they are moral in their contents or ſubject, and their legal conſequences are imputed, tho' they have no conſequences as to the body.

137. THAT all other domeſtic dreams draw after them imputation, and legal conſequences, is out of all doubt; ſeeing their conſequences as to the body, § 122. 124. conſequently, their morality has

been proved; for which, as being authors, we are accountable.

138. FOREIGN dreams, § 40. cannot be imputed to us, till we have given our conſent, § 135. and therefore, for the morality of the diabolical, the evil ſpirit is accountable. But as we are by nature morally evil, it but too eaſily happens, that we conſent to them with approbation, make them our own, and charge ourſelves with their imputation.

139. GOOD dreams, which either good angels naturally, or God himſelf ſupernaturally excites, do, as to their ſubject and end, become in like manner ours by conſent, § 135. But as we have a natural averſion from good, and only by the grace of God are made in love again with, and have a deſire after it; ſo many unconverted men may have good, nay, divine dreams, which are imputed to them, not for reward, but for puniſhment, as they refuſed their conſent to

them. Such was *Balaam*, Numb. xx. 20—22.

140. WHEN thus in our waking moments we delight in a foreign dream, whether it be good or bad, wiſh its completion, and contribute thereto, as far as is in our power, we give our conſent thereto, and make its legal conſequences our own. As on the contrary, we teſtify by our deteſtation, and putting a bar to its completion, our averſion and diſſent, *Numb.* xxxi. 16.

141. LEGAL conſequences are, when an evil action is puniſhed, that is, the offender repaid with the evil of ſuffering; and good actions rewarded with the beſtowing more good. Theſe conſequences are as various, as there are laws extant, which enjoin or forbid an action. It was remarked of dreams, § 131. that they neither are, nor can be, ſubject to any human laws, but only to the judgment of God, and our own conſcience. Accordingly, there is a twofold legal conſe-

quence of dreams; natural, which ariſes either in the ſoul, or alſo in the body, § 123. and produces pleaſure or pain: Supernatural, that which God at his pleaſure connects, in his law, with our free actions. Both are of a nature to make us either happy or miſerable: And hence our duty in general is to guard, as much as poſſible, againſt morally evil dreams, or giving our conſent to them; and to promote and approve the morally good, and thereby be qualified for reward. Whoever wants a more ſolid account of the nature of what is moral, and what imputable, may conſult the writings of our modern philoſophers; ſuch as *Canzius de Civitate Dei*, *Corpovius de Imputatione facti proprii & alieni*, and others, and eaſily make the application to the ſubject of dreams. What I have already ſaid, I deem to be ſufficient for my preſent purpoſe; as our duty in regard to dreams, may be abundantly eſtabliſhed thereby.

## CHAP. II.

### *The duties we are bound to obſerve in regard to Dreams.*

142. THE imputation, ariſing from dreams, encreaſes or abates our happineſs, § 141. as they happen to be either morally good, or evil. And therefore, as much as in us lies, we are obliged to prevent the diminution, and to promote the encreaſe of our happineſs. Whatever we do or omit for this end, I call *duty*: And therefore there are duties, which we are bound to obſerve in regard to dreams. As I know not that this ſpecies of duties has any where been treated of at large; but am well apprized that thoſe, who have incidentally mentioned them, have not always kept in the right path, but have run to one by-path or other; and that the generality of mankind are inclined to tread in one or other of theſe by-paths, either ſuperſtitiouſly

paying a regard to all dreams indiſcriminately, or rejecting them all without diſtinction: I ſhall therefore ſo much the rather attempt to propoſe theſe duties as circumſtantially, as the preceding account of dreams will well admit of; and in the firſt place, ſhall make it my buſineſs to avoid all unneceſſary prolixneſs, and then ſhew what we have to do.

143. SUPERSTITION is the firſt by-path, into which the bulk of mankind precipitately hurry, to the deſtroying their own happineſs, by falſe interpretations of dreams, and to the obſtructing their own peace of mind. By *ſuperſtition* I mean a fictitious force or power aſcribed to a thing, and not founded in the nature of that thing. And do not perſons who hold all dreams to be ſignificative, imagine a power both in their own, and in the ſouls of others, to know future indeterminate or contingent events, to reveal them under images, and in a word, to prophecy or foretel them? But that many hold dreams to be ſignificative or preſaging,

experience ſhews: As a tooth dropping out of the head, muſt neceſſarily preſage the death of ſome relation; a fire that burns bright, good fortune; ſmoke and vapour, misfortune and ill-will. And on what are the common dream-books founded, but on the idle opinion, that we know future contingencies? And to what elſe do they lead, but to the folly of making all dreams ſignificative?

144. HERE it would be proper to lay open the ſource of dreaming ſuperſtition, as I am not only juſt by it, but would alſo gladly ſtop and dry it up for ever. It conſiſts in the fond deſire of knowing future contingencies: This preſumption is born with us: And as we cannot ſatisfy it, we faſten on every thing that ſeems to give food thereto. And thus ſhould it happen that a dream or two hits, and one alſo hears the like from others, but being without a ſufficient knowledge of dreams, and incapable of diſtinguiſhing them into their ſeveral ſpecies, he is betrayed into the idle opinion, that the ſoul has a

natural faculty of knowing future contingencies, for diſplaying which ſhe has the fitteſt opportunity in ſleep. And there are always perſons, who out of ignorance or wantonneſs back them; yea, under cover of them, ſeek their own private advantage, and on that account miſlead others into ſuperſtition.

145. In order to obviate ſuperſtition, it is above all things neceſſary, to learn to diſtinguiſh between dreams and their ſeveral ſpecies; but in particular the domeſtic: As theſe ariſe in our own imagination, and are carried on according to the law thereof, § 11. can ſignify or preſage nothing, as in dreams our underſtanding ceaſes to act, § 48. and in other reſpects there is no reaſon aſſignable, from which the ſignification of domeſtic dreams can be derived. If notwithſtanding this, any one will inſiſt, that ſome of the domeſtic happen to hit according to the interpretation we meet with in dream-books, or other known books; I would entreat ſuch only to obſerve, that for one that

hits, a hundred interpretations miſcarry; and when one happens to anſwer, intelligent perſons will eaſily diſcover, that it ſo happened by mere chance. Let it be conſidered, how many actions of other creatures, partly neceſſary, partly voluntary, muſt often concur to the completion of a dream; and how in that caſe can we propoſe mutually to combine theſe in ſuch a manner, as that ſomething neceſſary muſt be the conſequence? Let it alſo be weighed, that God in a ſecret and unſearchable manner, ſo directs all things in their whole chain and connection, as to be the means to one general end; and I am perſuaded, that the natural predictive or preſaging faculty of our ſoul muſt appear very ſuſpicious, and it will eaſily be intelligible, that preſaging dreams take their riſe from a power without us, and cannot be quite ſo frequent and common; as the caſes are but very few, wherein they can be neceſſarily requiſite. For ſuch muſt be extraordinary, in which God inſtructs or warns us; as the ordinary have their fixed determination and

limits. But none will expect from the Devil, that grand liar, any dreams that ſhall foretell future events.

146. If we vainly ſuppoſe our ſouls endowed with a preſaging faculty, and our domeſtic dreams to be ſignificative, we not only obſtruct our own happineſs, but alſo promote our miſery. How this may happen, is not difficult to be conceived. If we imagine to ourſelves a good interpretation, we wiſh for the completion, and undertake ſuch actions as ſhall promote it. If we form to ourſelves an evil interpretation, we deteſt it, and exert ourſelves to the utmoſt to prevent and ward it off: Both ways we diſquiet our minds, and put ourſelves on fruitleſs attempts; from which further ſhame, ſorrow, and vexation muſt ariſe. All theſe things prove impediments to our happineſs, and a furtherance of our miſery; which make it our duty to combat ſuperſtition, and refrain from the interpretation of dreams that have no manner of ſignification.

147. Some of thoſe, who would avoid ſuperſtition on the one hand, are betrayed into a by-path on the other, and reject all dreams, as inſignificant ſallies of our imagination. But as it has been ſhewn, concerning all the external cauſes of dreams, that theſe cauſes excite them in us for ſome certain end; ſuch dreams are ſignificative or preſaging, § 54. and all of them without exception, even the domeſtic themſelves, are moral and imputable, § 137: And therefore, muſt not abſolutely be deſpiſed and rejected, but each ſpecies of them claims the obſervation of peculiar duties, which I will now more particularly explain and prove.

148. All obſcure dreams, § 8. are the reſult of our imagination, and therefore inſignificative or unpreſaging, § 53. For this reaſon we need not be under any peculiar concern, that they haunt us; but ought to examine ourſelves, whether in a ſtate of grace or of nature. For even obſcure dreams are imputed, § 137. and

in their moral nature reſemble the cauſe from which they ariſe, § 120. But if we are in a ſtate of grace, the buſineſs depends upon the contents or ſubject of our dreams, either good or bad; as in this ſtate, ſome actions ariſe from our corrupt affections, others again from our gracious ſtate. But as we cannot recollect ſuch a dream, we may hope, though the ſubject be evil, that, like other ſins of infirmity, it will not be imputed to us for condemnation. The contrary holds of thoſe, who are not in a ſtate of grace and favour with God. If the ſubject was good, yet the dream was inſignificative, becauſe obſcure, and therefore forgotten. For, with the ſignificative it cannot be ranked; ſeeing God, when he reveals, or ſuffers good to be revealed, does it in a lively manner, § 83. And the divine dream, *Dan.* ii. though an exception, yet conſtitutes no general rule. For the revelation of the forgotten dream, was procured by God as a means, whereby himſelf might be glorified, and *Daniel* exalted in a heathen country, and at an idolatrous court:

circumſtances, which offer not in all places, and at all times.

149. LIVELY domeſtic dreams are inſignificative, § 53. but all of them of a moral nature, and imputable, § 137. And when we come to recollect them, we ought to examine their ſubject; as we may be aſſured, that evil is a teſtimony of our evil, as good is of our ſanctified nature. For ſuch as our dreams are, as the effects; ſuch muſt we ourſelves be, as the cauſes, in reſpect to moral qualities, § 120.

150. DOMESTIC dreams are inſignificative, § 53. and therefore ſuch as hold them to be predictions of future good fortune are ſuperſtitious, § 143. and deſtroy their own happineſs, which yet they are bound to promote, § 146.

151. DOMESTIC dreams are in their ſubject good or bad, § 121. but all of them ariſe from the antecedent thoughts, which above all others have engroſſed our

attention, § 19. And ſuch thoughts are above all others lively, as are ſuitable to our inclinations, § 20. ſpontaneouſly directed on ſome object or other, § 27. or containing ſomething extraordinary, § 28. Whatever is not founded in antecedent lively thoughts, depends either on the ſtate of our body, § 35. or on a body acting upon us, of which we form to ourſelves a falſe conception, and therefrom begin a dream, and carry it on, ſuitably to the law of our imagination, § 37. All theſe circumſtances come to be conſidered in the determination of our duty, with regard to domeſtic dreams.

152. If we find the origin of a dream, evil in its ſubject or contents, to ariſe from our antecedent thoughts, we ought to apply all our care to the future amendment of them, in order to avoid their imputation, and the deſtruction of our happineſs. And therefore muſt, 1. Moderate and ſubdue our inclinations to the utmoſt. 2. Direct our thoughts on nothing morally evil; unleſs it be to examine

and diſcover its extreme viciouſneſs. 3. Withdraw our thoughts from what is uncommon or extraordinary, as ſoon as we diſcover any moral evil therein, or manifeſt and lay open its deviation from the law. 4. Improve, as much as in us lies, the ſtate of our body: And 5. Above all keep our imaginative faculty, pure from vicious images and lewd repreſentations. I am well aware, that we cannot abſolutely forbear thinking on morally evil objects; nay, that caſes happen, in which we muſt repreſent to ourſelves, and examine, their nature. But I am alſo well aſſured, that when it is done without taking pleaſure therein, and with paſſing a right judgment thereon, that then occaſion will not readily be given to a morally evil dream.

153. WHAT is once done, cannot be undone, and a morally evil dream cannot be made morally good. And therefore, we are to beg forgiveneſs of God, as of all others, ſo alſo of this failing, and earneſtly pray, that for the future he will

be pleaſed to keep us from vicious lewd dreams. But ſhould notwithſtanding ſuch a dream ariſe, we may hope that it will not be imputed to us to our condemnation; as by our attention to our duty, and our prayers againſt ſuch dreams, we previouſly withdraw our conſent from them, and teſtify that our will takes no pleaſure in them.

154. SUCH duties are, alas! not only neglected by many, partly from ignorance, partly from wantonneſs, but alſo ſuperſtitious means employed in order to excite dreams, either in perſons who uſe them, or in others. Can any practice be more irrational and ſuperſtitious than for one, who has ſcarce ended a dream concerning another, to go directly and turn his pillow upſide down, in order that he may dream of himſelf what he dreamed of the other? And is it to be ſuffered, that in public writings the ridiculous propoſal ſhould be made, of ſtuffing one's pillow with the feathers of different birds, that

the images of a dream may be more diverſified and confuſed? If this is not the reſult of waking dreams, I know not what in nature can be called ſo.

155. THIS treatiſe may poſſibly fall into the hands of perſons, who may read it out of curioſity, and laugh at the new-deviſed duties, as they may imagine them; being themſelves accuſtomed, inſtead of ſaying their evening-prayers, to read, and employ their thoughts on ſome idle romance or other, in order to have the like dreams. As ſuch perſons account themſelves wiſe, I would only beg of them, to vouchſafe to make a few ſober reflections, on what we have advanced about the morality of dreams, and carefully to examine, whether it be conſiſtent with reaſon or no. Should this appear too difficult a taſk for them, I permit them freely to laugh on; but at the ſame time they will allow me, heartily to pity their imaginary wiſdom, till it be determined, which of us have miſſed of the truth.

156. If the ſubject of domeſtic dreams be morally good, this is a token of our own good diſpoſition, § 149. This ſtate we are carefully to preſerve, ſo as not to interrupt, or quite deſtroy it by vicious thoughts and actions; as even in our gracious ſtate, there lies concealed a root of evil, which, when foſtered and nouriſhed, ſoon brings forth noxious fruits.

157. Among domeſtic good dreams, thoſe on divine objects, § 25. have the preheminence: And as they ariſe from our delight in God and his works; ſo we ought to employ our meditations frequently on ſuch ſubjects; in order the oftner to enjoy ſo bleſſed a ſleep and dream.

158. Diabolical dreams come the neareſt to the domeſtic, § 62. yet they are foreign to us, § 40. and ſignificative; and hence we have other duties to obſerve in regard to them, from what we have as to the domeſtic, As they are foreign to

us, they cannot be imputed to us, till we have given our conſent to them, § 135. Againſt this our conſent, we are moſt of all to be on our guard in the caſe of diabolical dreams; and as this principally happens by our delighting in the ſubject of them, and our longing for their completion, it eaſily appears, what we ought to do in oppoſition to them. Namely, we muſt 1. Carefully apply ourſelves to the practice of piety, that by our wicked practices we may have no fellowſhip with the Devil, or give him room to excite dreams in us at his pleaſure. 2. Heartily pray, that he may have no power or influence over us; and though 3. He may, notwithſtanding, be permitted to miſemploy our imagination, and excite dreams in us; our care muſt be to deteſt their ſubject, and withſtand their completion. And in order 4. to behave more circumſpectly, on account of the difficulty there is in diſtinguiſhing between diabolical and domeſtic dreams, § 62. we are in like manner to behave in regard to thoſe dreams, which are ſuitable to our incli-

nations, and appear to be domeſtic, as the Devil moſt readily avails himſelf of our inclinations; and we promote our own happineſs, though we may erroneouſly account dreams, that are ſuitable to our inclinations, to be diabolical. But ſhould one or more characteriſtics of a diabolical dream appear, § 61. and bewray the end or tendency thereof, we ought ſo much the more to deteſt it, the more certain we are that he is intent both on our temporal and eternal ruin, § 43. But though this be the end of diabolical dreams, yet he cannot violently force us to yield our conſent, or practice any thing further on us; only excite dreams, and attempt to ſeduce us. And therefore it would be an immoderate fear, for a perſon after ſuch a dream to change his place of reſt, or at leaſt to refuſe any longer to reſt there.

160. As the Devil readily wants to biaſs our inclinations to, and dazzle them with apparent good, we ſhall be not a little on our guard againſt diabolical

dreams, and againſt yielding our conſent to them, if in our calmer moments we often reflect on the emptineſs of all apparent good, and thereby withdraw our longings from it, and by frequent meditation on the true good, turn them wholly upon that. For, as long as we are indifferent as to a thing, ſo long our underſtanding ſtands diſengaged in its judgments, and ſuffers itſelf not to be dazzled by any ſpecious appearances.

161. DREAMS, ariſing from good angels, are excited at the command of God, and have one and the ſame end with the ſupernatural, § 70. And therefore require the obſervation of no peculiar duties, but ſuch as are the very ſame in the caſe of the ſupernatural; only that we accurately examine their ſubject and tendency, that the Devil may not tranſform himſelf into an angel of light, and deceive us under the ſpecious appearance of good, § 59. Or when they happen to have the ſignatures and marks of the angelical, § 58. that we pay no greater

honour to any angel, than he himſelf requires, *Rev.* xxii. 8, 9. For ſhould God, for holy and wiſe ends, permit it for our trial, the Devil might transform himſelf into an angel of light, even for the purpoſe of adoration, as he had the ſhameleſs aſſurance to inſiſt upon it from Chriſt himſelf, even while awake. *Matth.* iv. 9.

162. God in the early ages, by means of dreams, revealed things which relate to the eternal happineſs of all men, in all ages, § 78. ſuch is *Jacob*'s dream, *Gen.* xxviii. 14. and *Joſeph*'s, Matth. i. 20, 21. Of this ſort we are not to expect any in our days, as the whole counſel of God, as far as is neceſſary for us to know for our happineſs, is not only made known, *Acts* xx. 27. 2 *Pet.* i. 19. but alſo ſealed, *Dan.* ix. 24. *Rev.* xxii. 18, 19. Hence all dreams, which pretend to reveal new articles of faith or practice, are diabolical temptations, *Deut.* xiii. 2. And who can aſſure us, that they are not the mere fictions, and the bare imaginations of a fanatic ſpirit

and diſordered brain, ſhould any one in our day pretend to boaſt of revelations by dreams, for the improvement of faith and practice? And therefore we can as little hold them for divine, as adviſe others to take them for ſuch. For ſhould we ſuppoſe, that ſuch a dream has as well the general ſignatures or marks of a divine dream, § 71--75. as the peculiar, § 79--82. Yet it would be ſomething ſuperfluous, that God ſhould once more reveal truths already revealed, and ſufficiently proved; conſequently, contrary to his wiſdom, which admits of nothing ſuperfluous. If the dream happened to ſwerve from the general characteriſtics, it would be entirely evident, that it was not divine, § 71. And the evaſion, that God can reveal ſtill more than he actually has, would be idle; as the queſtion is not concerning what God can do, but what he chooſes to do. But this he has manifeſted to us, in the text already quoted, and *Gal.* i. 8, 9. And thus be it far from us, to have any inclination to give our conſent to new Prophets and Evangeliſts.

163. But God has alſo revealed the fate, both of whole communities, and of particular perſons, living at a particular fixed period of time, and diſcovered by dreams their impending changes or viciſſitudes in temporals, § 85. Cannot this caſe ſtill happen in our days? This queſtion muſt be diſtinctly explained, before it can be well anſwered. In general, God can ſtill do this, and there is no where any expreſs declaration, that he will not any more do ſo. But we are to remark, that 1. As to whole communities, he only reveals the temporal fate of thoſe, under whoſe protection or oppreſſion the true church happens to be. The *Egyptian* dearth brought the poſterity of *Abraham*, according to the determined counſel and fore knowledge of God, *Gen.* xv. 13, 14. into *Egypt*, Gen. 47. and they lived under *Nebuchadnezzar*'s dominion, at the time he had the dream, recorded *Dan.* ii. as alſo *Dan.* iv. On the contrary, none of the viciſſitudes that befel *Nebuchadnezzar*, and that ſtood in no manner of connection with the true church, were made known by any ſort of revela-

tion, but remained among the general, and, to men, ſecret counſels of divine providence. And therefore we are to expect no ſimilar revelation, but in perfectly ſimilar caſes. But this is already made known by *John* in his *Revelation*, as what contains the fate of the church, and of her enemies, down to the end of the world: And therefore any further revelation is unneceſſary. The objection, that God may impart a clearer and more diſtinct view of the circumſtances thereof, does not hold. For upon it our happineſs in no manner depends, which in all its circumſtances muſt be determined or fixed; but it ſufficeth, if at length the accompliſhment clears up that which ſeemed to be obſcure in the prediction: And it alſo ſufficeth, to preſerve the members of the church conſtant and unſhaken, if they know that nothing befals them without the concurrence of divine providence, and that as great a reward of grace awaits their ſufferings, as juſt a puniſhment awaits their enemies. And therefore we ſhould deceive ourſelves, ſhould we hold dreams, concerning the fate of certain

communities in our time, to be divine. But 2. as to particular and ſingular events, in which particular perſons may be involved, it is not inconſiſtent with the divine wiſdom, to inform them thereof in particular; and that even by dreams, as a proper means for that purpoſe. Becauſe *firſt*, ſingle perſons cannot diſtinguiſh their own peculiar fate from the general fate. We will for illuſtration pitch upon the oppreſſion of the church in the latter days: Amidſt which God will protect and preſerve his church; yet ſo as to permit the enemy to exerciſe his cruelty and malice on ſeveral ſingle members, to perſecute and ſlay them on account of the word and teſtimony. What ſingle member can thus be ſure, that he is not appointed by providence to be a martyr, and to ſeal the truth with his blood? In this caſe, our concern for the preſervation of life, and our contempt of it for the ſake of the truth, come to claſh or interfere. And who can ſo accurately ſee through all the conſequences of his actions, as to behave in nothing inconſiſtently, with the duty either of

preſerving, or of deſpiſing life? Now if God is pleaſed to make uſe of any perſon, as a peculiar inſtrument in defence of the truth, it is ſuitable to the divine wiſdom, and to the circumſtances of the perſon himſelf, *ſecondly*, to procure a clearer notion of the divine appointment; in order the more chearfully to deſpiſe every impending danger, and undauntedly maintain the truth, come death, come life. Seeing, without a more diſtinct knowledge, he may eaſily fall into various ſcruples, and either over or under-act his part And why, in particular caſes, which are ſubordinate to his general providence, God ſhould not warn perſons, acceptable to him, and qualified for executing his purpoſes, of an impending danger, or reveal a future good, in order to their receiving and uſing it with the greater thankfulneſs? No reaſon can readily be aſſigned.

164. SHOULD ſomething concerning the impending fate of a perſon be revealed by God, ſuch perſon ought without delay to follow the warning againſt evil, even ſuppoſing the time did not admit the previous

examination of all the circumſtances and characteriſtics. For warnings againſt evil, proceed only from morally good ſpirits, either from God himſelf immediately, or mediately at his command from angels; as the Devil ſeeks not our benefit but our ruin, and our ſoul neither can, nor does of herſelf know future contingencies.

165. If divine dreams reveal a future good, with reſpect to this life, we are to wait the event with patience, neither to hinder it by our bad conduct, nor preſume from our own powers to haſten its accompliſhment. God often leads us through byways to the propoſed end, as *Joſeph*'s exaltation ſhews. Theſe ways of God are not only unknown to us, but alſo unpleaſant and diſagreable to fleſh and blood. And were we to haſten a good, pointed out to us at a diſtance, we might readily pitch on other means than God has appointed; which would be to intrench upon his wiſe government, and rather to hinder than further our happineſs. Suffice it if we do not, by our bad conduct, diſqualify ourſelves for that good, and obſtruct its accompliſhment.

166. If divine dreams are accompliſhed, we have no reaſon to boaſt that they were revealed to us. All are not the favourites of heaven, to whom divine dreams are vouchſafed, as may be ſeen in *Balaam* and *Nebuchadnezzar*. Yea, it is no ways inconſiſtent, that a perſon ſhall obtain a previouſly revealed temporal good, and by the miſemployment of it loſe the eternal.

167. As little reaſon have we to give ourſelves up to puſillanimity, or even to deſpair, ſhould a revelation be made of the bad ſucceſs of any undertaking. For by prayer, and amendment of life, not only much may be altered therein, but God alſo may appoint the evil in temporals, in order to promote and obtain our ſpiritual and eternal good. A ſeverer bodily puniſhment of the pride of a king can ſcarce be imagined than that recorded *Dan.* iv. 22 yet it might have been averted, *v.* 24: And a morally good end, tending to the benefit of the king, was what God had in view, and actually obtained.

168. NONE, in fine, will be ſo preſumptuous, as to beg of God to reveal his future fate by dreams. For if neceſſary for us, and conſiſtent with the divine wiſdom, God reveals it without our aſking. But if inconſiſtent with his wiſdom, our petition would be fooliſh and fond. He only hears and grants what we pray for according to his will. And how many uneaſy moments and carking cares would it not cauſe, did we know beforehand, thro' how many adverſe ſcenes our life is to paſs?

169. IF ſo much circumſpection is neceſſary in our own dreams, it will be eaſily admitted, that no leſs is requiſite to examine or properly interpret the dreams of others, and to adminiſter the beſt advice. Thoſe at leaſt cannot eſcape a ſevere account at the tribunal of God, who by their brain-ſick fancies, namely, the interpretations contained in dream-books, either for diſhoneſt gain, or to add to the number of their frantic votaries, miſ-

lead perſons, moſtly ſimple and ignorant, into ſuperſtition.

170. BUT I plainly ſee, that the dreaming interpreters of dreams will hardly be brought to a ſoberer mind; the reaſon of which I find in myſelf. In this life we are like ſo many dreaming perſons, that is, having obſcure and confuſed notions of moſt things, not unlike what we have in dreams: And theſe obſtruct the lively and perſuaſive knowledge of truth. And therefore my only requeſt to God is, that he will be pleaſed ſo to direct myſelf, and all lovers of truth, as that we may not be fond of the tranſitory phantoms, with which we are encompaſſed, and our ſenſes encumbered in this preſent ſtate; but rather excite in us all, an ardent deſire after the happy ſtate of the life to come, in which we ſhall be delivered from every degree of confuſion, and enjoy an uninterrupted and eternal happineſs.

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56 – God Excites dreams L

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57. Pharnabis Dream – Pain
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